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If there can only be ‘one law’, it must be Treaty law. Learning from Kanawayandan D’aaki 
 
Dayna Nadine Scott & Andrée Boisselle 
 
Abstract. The paper stems from a research collaboration with the Anishini or Oji-Cree 
community of Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (KI), known as the people of Big Trout Lake in 
the far north of Ontario. In the face of renewed threats of encroachment by extractive industries 
onto their homelands, the community invited our research team to visit in 2017. The community 
was engaged in strategic planning and reflection on the work that they have done in recent years 
to articulate and record their own laws for the territory, and to gain recognition for those laws 
from settler governments.  Between 2008 and 2018, the community drafted a Declaration of 
Sovereignty, a Governance Framework, a Watershed Declaration and a Consultation Protocol, 
amongst other ‘operational documents’ describing their Indigenous legal order. The period of 
legal drafting was stimulated by a legal dispute between the community and a mining company, 
Platinex, that culminated in 2008 with the jailing of the Chief, 4 members of Council and another 
community member who became known as the “KI6”.  Despite community members describing 
their obligation to protect the land drawn from the key legal concept of Kanawayandan D’aaki, 
roughly translated as “keeping my land”, the KI6 were convicted of contempt of court for 
disobeying a court order to provide Platinex with access for its drilling program. The courts’ 
message to the community in 2008 was essentially that only ‘one law’ could govern the land; the 
application of settler law on KI lands could not accommodate the community members’ 
obligations under Indigenous law. In our collaboration, community members expressed an 
interest in exploring the question of whether the process of writing down their laws would assist 
the community in any future encounters with the Canadian legal system in disputes over resource 
extraction.   
 
In this paper, we draw on the transcripts from workshops conducted in KI in 2017 to share 
insights into the motivations of the community in articulating their laws, and we explore the 
question of how to reinvigorate historic treaty interpretations so as to produce ‘one law’ inclusive 
of Indigenous legal orders.  We conclude that if there can be only ‘one law’ on treaty territory, it 
must be a renewed and reinvigorated treaty law. We draw on principles and mechanisms from 
the modern treaty context to discuss how pressing decisions on the use of the land and resources 
could be made differently in Treaty 9 territory. In our vision, in situations where settler law says 
‘yes’ and Indigenous law says ‘no’ to a resource extraction project, treaty law must provide a 
principled framework for moving forward.   
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Introduction 
This research is part of a larger SSHRC-funded project entitled “Consent & Contract: 
Authorizing Extraction in Ontario’s Ring of Fire”.1  Both the larger project and this particular 
contribution are investigating the current dynamics in the far north of Ontario around contested 
resource extraction on Indigenous lands. Renewed threats of encroachment by extractive 
industries onto Indigenous homelands exist in the context of continuing controversy over the 
potential development of Ontario’s Ring of Fire mineral deposits, sometimes called Ontario’s 
“oil sands”. 2 The Ring of Fire refers to a massive, crescent-shaped deposit of minerals including 
nickel, gold and most significantly chromite, for which estimates range from 20-100 years for the 
potential life of a mine.3 The communities that will be immediately impacted by the development 
of the Ring of Fire and its associated infrastructure are small, remote Oji-Cree and Anishinaabe 
communities, fly-in only or with limited winter road access. These communities are struggling to 
overcome the trauma of residential schools, a legacy that includes a rupture in intergenerational 
transmission of language and laws, land and kinship relations.4  All of these impacts are 
compounded by continuing colonial relations and decades of state neglect, which in some 
communities is manifest in youth suicide and addiction crises, and a persistent lack of access to 
clean drinking water.5 The community of Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (KI), although it is 
outside of the Ring of Fire region (see Figure 1 below) has established an alliance with some of 
these remote communities, and is interested in sharing its own experience of resisting extractive 
activities in the context of the renewed attention to mining.6 
 
The leadership of KI reached out to members of our research collaboration and expressed an 
interest in exploring the question of whether the process of writing down their laws – the intense 
period of legal drafting that KI has engaged in over the past decade -- will assist them in 
expected future encounters with the Canadian legal system in disputes over resource extraction.  
A related question is also whether a process of legal drafting similar to the one that KI has 
engaged in would assist Ring of Fire communities in their own defence of their homelands.  We 
                                                 
1 This grant is led by Professor Scott, and includes Professors Boisselle, Deborah McGregor and Estair Van Wagner as co-
investigators. John Cutfeet (KI) and Donna Ashamock (MoCreebec) are community-based researchers with the project and were 
critical leaders of the workshops in KI, as well as co-presenters of this work at the Decolonizing Law? Conference held at the 
University of Windsor Law School in March 2018. We thank the participants and organizers of that conference for their feedback 
and support. Other collaborators on the project, broadly speaking, have included Shiri Pasternak, Jennifer Wabano, David Peerla, 
Deborah Cowen and Joan Kuyek. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug leadership contributed significantly to the conception of the 
research questions in this paper, and the insights and analysis shared by community members attending the workshops, as well as 
other collaborators, inevitably shaped the ultimate argument. The Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug retain ownership of the 
knowledge shared in the workshops. Research assistance has been provided by JD students Graham Reeder, Jennifer Fischer, and 
MES/JD student Amanda Spitzig. Any errors or misunderstandings are our own.  
2 Daniel Tencer, “Clement: Ontario 'Ring Of Fire' Will Be Canada's Next Oil Sands”, The Huffington Post Canada (April 26, 
2013), online: <www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/04/26/ring-of-fire-ontario-tony-clement_n_3159644.html>. 
3 “Clement won’t allow Ring of Fire to be ‘mired in uncertainty’”, CBC News (February 19, 2013), online: 
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/clement-won-t-allow-ring-of-fire-to-be-mired-in-uncertainty-1.1395382>. 
4 Michelle Daigle, “Resurging through Kishiichiwan: The spatial politics of Indigenous water relations” (2018) 7(1) 
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 159-172. 
5 For example, the Neskantaga First Nation has been under a boil water advisory for 25 years, see Christina Chung, “Neskantaga 
FN still waiting to end 25-year boil water advisory as Trudeau promises 2021” (March 28, 2019), online: < 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/neskantaga-prime-minister-bwa-1.5073496>.   
6 Members of our team and collaborators also visited KI again in the summer of 2018, with delegations from Neskantaga First 
Nation and Eabametoong First Nation, for the purposes of advancing the three communities’ interest in working together and 
drawing strength from each community’s experience.  A political alliance emerged from that meeting, and collective work is 
ongoing. 
3 
 
accepted the invitation to visit the community in August 2017 to facilitate the community’s 
discussions on this topic.7 
 
In this paper we draw on transcripts from the 2017 workshops to gain insight into the 
motivations that were driving the people of KI to articulate their laws, and we begin the 
investigation of the complex question of how to reinvigorate historic treaty interpretations so as 
to produce ‘one law’ inclusive of Indigenous legal orders, in the specific context of Treaty 9.  In 
Part I, we describe our theoretical orientation and methodology, in Part II we describe the 
context for the workshops, focussing on the 2008 dispute between KI and Platinex and the court 
rulings that came out of it, and in Part III we explore the question most interesting to socio-legal 
scholars: how can we reinvigorate historic treaty interpretations so as to produce ‘one law’ 
inclusive of Indigenous legal orders on the ground? In other words, we are beginning the work 
towards developing a ‘principled answer’ to the question that Hadley Friedland poses: “What 
happens when Indigenous laws say, 'No', and Canadian law says 'Yes’ to resource extraction?”8  
Ours is a visioning project, an exercise in articulating a shift in the jurisdictional landscape for 
the far north; demonstrating an alternative to the current trajectory in which Indigenous and 
settler laws inevitably clash.9 
 
Part I: Critical Legal Pluralism and Community-Based Methods 
The dynamics of resource extraction in the far north of Ontario are largely, and increasingly, 
shaped by the negotiation of contractual agreements.10 These exist in a variety of forms; they 
include resource-revenue sharing deals between tribal councils and the provincial government, 
impact-benefit agreements (IBAs) between communities and companies, early exploration 
agreements and MOUs and framework agreements between communities and various 
governments and agencies over infrastructure or environmental assessment funding, among 
others.  In all cases, the negotiations are secretive and give rise to a dynamic of competition 
between neighboring communities, the imposition of external timelines, and the dominance of 
lawyers.11   
                                                 
7 The workshops in 2017 were conducted mainly by Donna Ashamock and Dayna Nadine Scott, with support and assistance from 
John Cutfeet and Chief James Cutfeet, and other members of the KI Band office. 
8 Hadley Friedland, quoted in Lauren Kaljur and Trevor Jang, “Why Building a Pipeline on Indigenous Land is Complicated 
Even If You Own It”, Huffpost (4 July 2018), online: <https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2018/06/29/building-trans-mountain-
pipeline-indigenous-land-complicated_a_23471203/>. The authors also provide a contemporary example of the clash of 
authorities in the resistance at Unisto’ ot’en and the Gimiden checkpoint in 2018-2019. 
9 We have drawn inspiration from Deborah Curran’s work on the Great Bear Rainforest Agreements in British Columbia, which 
she argues “shifted the ecological and jurisdictional landscape in British Columbia”, see Deborah Curran, “”Legalizing” the 
Great Bear Rainforest Agreements Colonial Adaptations toward Reconciliation and Conservation” (2017) 62:3 McGill LJ at 817 
[Curran “Legalizing the Great Bear Rainforest Agreements”]. 
10 This may be true of the country as a whole.  For example, political scientists Martin Papillon and Thierry Rodon observe that 
we have a largely “proponent-driven model for seeking Indigenous consent” to natural resource extraction, with impact-benefit 
agreements between companies and Indigenous communities being the “core mechanism” for establishing the legitimacy of those 
projects (Martin Papillon and Thierry Rodon, “Proponent-Indigenous agreements and the implementation of the right to free, 
prior, and informed consent in Canada” (2017) 62 Environmental Impact Assessment Review 216–224. 
11 O’Faircheallaigh calls this the negotiation bubble: Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Corporate – Aboriginal Agreements on Mineral 
Development: The Wider Implications of Contractual Arrangements” (Paper delivered to Rethinking Extractive Industries 
Conference, York University, 5 March 2009); Irene Sosa & Karyn Keenan, Impact benefit agreements between aboriginal 
communities and mining companies: their use in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Environmental Law Association, 2001) at 2; Emilie 
Cameron & Tyler Levitan, “Impact and benefit agreements and the neoliberalization of resource governance and indigenous-state 
relations in northern Canada” (2014) 93 Studies in Political Economy online: University of Toronto, 
http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/view/21331 [Cameron & Levitan “Impact and Benefit Agreements”]; Ken J 
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Over the past several years, we have watched as industry has come to accept that ‘deal-making’ 
with Indigenous governments is perhaps easier and more predictable than complying with the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s consultation framework and then ‘rolling the dice’.12 Companies 
have embraced the idea of ‘social license’, if not the spirit of corporate social responsibility, and 
have recognized that even approved projects are not being built because of lengthy court 
proceedings related to Indigenous opposition.13  Further, savvy industry operators are said to 
understand well that even success in the courts is not going to ensure that projects can proceed, 
because of the growing legitimacy that Indigenous land defenders are garnering across the 
country.14  The legal framework provided by settler law is not achieving the resource certainty 
that industry demands.15  Thus, negotiating a deal has become the first priority of industry 
interested in advancing a controversial extractive project; facilitating those deals has become a 
key task of state actors.16  These negotiations between governments, industry and Indigenous 
                                                 
Caine & Naomi Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full? A Power Analysis of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s 
North” (2010) 23:1 Organization & Environment 76 at 85 [Caine & Krogman “Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full”].  
12 Papillon and Rodon argue that impact-benefit agreements between industry and communities have “de facto become the main 
vehicle for securing Indigenous support for a project in Canada, as in other settler societies”, see Martin Papillon & Thierry 
Rodon, “Environmental Assessment Processes and the Implementation of Indigenous Peoples Free, Prior and Informed Consent” 
Report to the Expert Panel Reviewing Federal Environmental Assessment Processes (December 2016) at 20 [Papillon & Rodon 
“Environmental Assessment Processes and FPIC”]; see also the Boreal Leadership Council, Understanding Successful 
Approaches to Free, Prior and Informed Consent in Canada: Part I: Recent Developments and Effective Roles for Government, 
Industry and Indigenous Communities, (September 2015) online: Boreal Leadership Council 
http://borealcouncil.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/BLC_FPIC_Successes_Report_Sept_2015_E.pdf [Boreal Leadership Council 
“FPIC”]; Guillaume Peterson St-Laurent & Philippe Le Billon, “Staking claims and shaking hands: Impact and benefit 
agreements as a technology of government in the mining sector” (2015) 2:3 Extr. Ind. Soc [St-Laurent & Le Billon “Staking 
Claims and Shaking hands”]; the communities’ input; O’Faircheallaigh calls it the “ideology of agreement making” (306), see 
Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh “Evaluating agreements between indigenous peoples and resource developers” (2004) In Honour among 
nations? Treaties and agreements with indigenous peoples, eds M. Langton, M. Tehan, L. Palmer, & K. Shain, (Melbourne, 
Australia: Melbourne University Press) at 303-328.  
13 Shin Imai “Consult, Consent & Veto: International Norms and Canadian Treaties, in The Right Relationship, Reimagining the 
Implementation of Historical Treaties eds. Michael Coyle and John Borrows, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) [Imai, 
“Consult, Consent & Veto”]. This point is explained by D.L. Corbett J., “[The proponent’s] frustration and its interests in moving 
forward with the Project are not valid reasons to defeat [Saugeen Ojibway Nation’s] constitutional rights.  When there are 
disagreements about consultations, providing a remedy for a First Nation will often cause delay.  Thus, though the duty to consult 
is the Crown’s, proponents have an interest in facilitating the consultation process.  In this case, [the proponent] refused that 
role.  It was entitled to do this, but one consequence of its decision is further delay to complete adequate consultations” in 
Saugeen First Nation v. Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources and Forestry), 2017 ONSC 3456, 4 CNLR 213 at para 8. A high 
profile example of delay comes from the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision to overturn the National Energy Board’s approval of 
the TransCanada Pipeline Expansion Project (in 2013) for reasons including a failure to meet the constitutional duty to consult, 
see Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 CAF 153, 2018 FCA 153 [Tsleil-Waututh].   
14 Land defenders are those on the frontlines fighting to protect Indigenous homelands and traditional territory, often against 
resource development or Crown activity, and have been active across Canada in standoffs such as the one against the Trans 
Mountain pipeline expansion and the Unist’ot’en camp opposing extractive infrastructure. See Kanahus Manuel, “Indigenous 
Land Defenders Denounce Canada’s Criminalization at Burnaby Mountain” Muskrat Magazine (10 April 2018), online: 
<http://muskratmagazine.com/indigenous-land-defenders-denounce-canadas-criminalization-burnaby-mountain/> and “Home” 
(2017) Unisto’ot’en Camp, online: < https://unistoten.camp >. Leanne Simpson proposes that the protection of Indigenous 
culture, language and tradition occurs when advocates “[put] their bodies on the land” in communities, actively practice 
traditions, and protect their lands from destruction; rather than in Parliament or in the context of academic research, see Leanne 
Betasamosake Simpson, “Land as pedagogy: Nishnaabeg intelligence and rebellious transformation”, (2014) 3:3 Decolonization: 
Indigeneity, Education & Society at 21. The concept of ‘land defenders’ has been formalized in a network of Indigenous 
communities and activists based in Manitoba, called Defenders of the Land, see “Defenders of the Land: Indigenous Peoples 
have clear demands for real change” (5 January 2013), online: Indigenous Environmental Network 
<http://www.ienearth.org/defenders-of-the-land-indigenous-peoples-have-clear-demands-for-real-change/>. 
15 Eva Mackey “Unsettling Expectations: (Un)Certainty, Settler States of Feeling, Law and Decolonization” (2014) 29 Can JL & 
Soc at 235; Carole Blackburn, “Searching for Guarantees in the Midst of Uncertainty: Negotiating Aboriginal Rights and Title in 
British Columbia” (2005) 107:4 American Anthropologist 586 [Blackburn, “Negotiating Aboriginal Rights and Title”]. 
16 The Boreal Leadership Council, a multi-stakeholder consortium that includes industry, Aboriginal 
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communities are significant for the way that a signed deal has come to ‘stand-in’ for expressions 
of consent in neoliberal frameworks. Despite the fact that there are a myriad of strong reasons for 
why the mere fact of a signed agreement cannot be evidence of free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) as it is understood in international law, extraction in the contemporary moment seems to 
be authorized by the signing of a contract between industry and affected communities. The 
successful conclusion of a deal provides both crucial legitimation for political actors supporting 
contested resource projects, and a valued asset for companies seeking to market their projects to 
potential investors.17  
 
Authorizing Extraction on Indigenous Lands 
Extractivism, in our analysis, is not dependent on the type of resource taken, but by the 
underlying political economy.18 That is, the term is not reserved for fossil fuels and mineral 
extraction; neither would it apply to the extraction of those materials in all contexts  – it is 
understood as a mode of accumulation in which a high pace and scale of ‘taking’ generates 
benefits for distant capital without generating benefits for local people.19 It is a way of relating to 
lands and waters that is non-reciprocal and oriented to the short-term. 
 
Our approach to the idea of authorizing extraction is influenced by the scholarship on legal 
pluralism. That is, we see extraction as governed by a range of overlapping and potentially 
conflicting norms and normative processes at the intersection of the relevant Indigenous, settler 
state, and international legal orders.20 Any contractual agreements between industry and 
Indigenous communities authorizing extraction on the latter’s territories – the most superficial 
layer of those overlapping norms, and the one often now seen as evidence of “consent” to 
extraction – arises out of a context of constrained choices dictated by the interaction between 
those multiple legal orders’ distinctive normative commitments. Those include the settler state’s 
common law – from its contractual regime, to its Aboriginal rights jurisprudence under s. 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, which details a duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal and 
                                                 
organizations and non-governmental organizations, in 2015 concluded that “consent is the mechanism that will offer the most 
certainty for proponents” (5), Boreal Leadership Council, “FPIC”, supra note 12. And as Blackburn has demonstrated, certainty, 
however unachievable, is a highly valued resource for industry, Blackburn “Negotiating Aboriginal Rights and Title”, supra note 
15. See for example, Eabametoong First Nation v Minister of Northern Development and Mines, 2018 ONSC 4316, (Div Court) 
[Eabametoong]. Similarly, Fidler states that impact-benefit agreements “are being viewed by the government as a means to an 
end for consultation” (61), see Courtney Riley Fidler, Aboriginal participation in mineral development: environmental 
assessment and impact and benefit agreements, (Master of Applied Science, University of British Columbia, 2008). 
17For example, Kinder Morgan (the previous owner of the Trans Mountain pipeline) entered into 43 ‘Mutual Benefit Agreements’ 
with Indigenous communities along the proposed expanded pipeline route, see Gary Mason, “Environmentalists’ next opponent? 
First Nations”, The Globe and Mail (17 January 2019), online: < https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-
environmentalists-next-opponent-first-nations/>. Papillon & Rodon, “Environmental Assessment Processes and FPIC”, supra 
note 12. 
18 Henry Veltmeyer, “The Natural Resource Dynamics of Post Neoliberalism In Latin America: New Developmentalism Or 
Extractivist Imperialism?” (2012) 90:1 SPE at 72. 
19 Following Veltmeyer, for whom extractivism is a specific type of development path in which the social and environmental 
costs of a project exceed its benefits, which tend to be highly concentrated, while the costs are disproportionately borne by poor 
and vulnerable local residents. In the Canadian context, affected communities are often “dispossessed from any means of social 
production except for their capacity to labour, that many are expected to exchange for a living wage or a job at any cost” (61), see 
Henry Veltmeyer & Paul Bowles “Extractivist resistance: The case of the Enbridge oil pipeline project in Northern British 
Columbia” (2014) 1:1 Extractive Industries and Society 59 [Veltmeyer & Bowles, “Extractivist Resistance”].  
20 As Shiri Pasternak has stated, “the matter of not which law but whose law applies…on Indigenous territories” has been a 
neglected one in legal theory (2014, 160). In terms of nomenclature, we adopt the term “settler law” to signal that we are 
speaking of laws enacted by provincial legislatures or the federal Parliament, and the common law that has emerged from 
provincial and federal courts. The purpose of this signal is to ensure that settler law is distinguished from Indigenous law, which 
encompasses the existing and evolving legal orders that emanate from and continue to govern in each Indigenous community. 
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Treaty rights – and settler state legislation, such as the provincial Far North Act and Mining Act; 
international legal norms, such as the free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) standard in the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP); and most 
fundamentally,21 in the Ring of Fire area, Anishinaabe and Oji-Cree law – such as 
Kanawayandan D’aaki, the obligation to protect the land as understood by the 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (“KI” – the People of Big Trout Lake).22  
 
More than simply recognizing that law emanates from multiple sources – and approaching the 
state as only one of them23 – the legal pluralist scholarship we draw on leads us to inquire into 
the nature of the relationships between the contending legal orders at play on Treaty 9 territory, 
in and around the Ring of Fire. In our larger research project as well as the current piece, we 
became particularly interested in exploring how these “inter-order” relationships are inflected by 
different actors and their interventions in political struggle. Our inquiry began with a general 
goal of understanding how certain Indigenous communities engage with/against the extractive 
industry, how their engagement relates to their own laws and decision-making processes, and 
crucially, whether and how such engagement transforms the exploitative dynamic inherent to 
extractivism. As our research relationships developed in the region and came to focalize in KI (as 
we explain in more detail below), our deepening engagement with this community and with the 
range of its responses over time to extractivist incursions on their lands allowed us to develop 
more specific questions and arguments.  
 
In the current piece, our inquiry focuses on the shifting relationship between the Indigenous legal 
order of KI, and the settler state order – characterized mostly by Ontario’s interventions, but 
involving the federal Crown as well, as a Treaty partner. Seen through this theoretical lens of 
critical legal pluralism, our discussion proceeds in two stages. First, we present a window into 
KI’s interventions, which have included putting their bodies on the land and blocking access to 
their territory, defending their members’ actions by asserting Kanawayadan D’aaki in the settler 
court system, and articulating some of their laws and protocols to make their jurisdiction 
cognizable to the state. Such interventions were clearly crafted to engage purposefully with the 
settler state’s legal and political forums, and aimed to shift the terms of its rapport with KI – but 
just as clearly, these interventions spring from KI’s sense of its collective rights and 
responsibilities informed by its Oji-Cree legal tradition, and were conceived and implemented in 
accordance with the norms and processes of KI’s legal order.  
 
We then turn our attention to the actions of the settler state, which include not only legislative 
and executive interventions with specific repercussions on KI lands, but the development of 
Canadian jurisprudence regarding treaties, their meaning, and the Canadian legal order’s very 
legitimacy. Drawing on recent research pertaining to Treaty 9 specifically and to historic treaty 
                                                 
21 This stance stems from the affirmation that “prior to colonial settlement, Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island existed as diverse 
nations defined by their ancestral lands, kinship relations, governance structures, economic trading networks and well established 
yet fluid legal orders”: Michelle Daigle, “Awawanenitakik: The spatial politics of recognition and relational geographies of 
Indigenous self-determination” (2016) 60(2) The Canadian Geographer 259 at 260 [Daigle, “Awawanenitakik”]. 
22 Shiri Pasternak, Grounded Authority: Barriere Lake Against the State (University of Minnesota Press, 2017) at 7. 
23 In its most basic formulation, legal pluralism is the recognition that more than one legal order operates in the same social field, 
see Sally Engle-Merry “Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22 L & Soc’y Rev 869. This mode of socio-legal scholarship dislodges the 
state’s legal order from its unilaterally asserted position of superiority in regard to Indigenous legal orders. It defines law as the 
set of norms and processes that generate binding decisions and expectations within a given society, and that are used to resolve 
disputes peacefully therein. 
7 
 
doctrine more generally, we propose a reading of Treaty 9 as a vehicle for a decisive shift in the 
relationship between the Indigenous and settler legal orders in Canada: from one characterized 
by the state’s attempted denial, destruction, or co-optation of the Indigenous legal order 
(epitomized in the monist claim that there can only be “one law” on KI lands), to a cooperative 
relationship that allows a continuous grappling with legal plurality.24  
 
Community-based Research Methods 
 
The land matters.  The land, and knowledge of it, are crucial to the dynamics of extraction as 
they are playing out in the remote homelands of Anishinaabe and Oji-Cree nations in Ontario’s 
far north. These lands are characterized by intricate networks of lakes and rivers, vast muskeg 
and peat bogs dotted with black spruce, jack pine and white birch.  The far north is home to rare 
creatures such as caribou, bald eagles and wolverines.25  It is possibly the largest intact boreal 
forest remaining in the world, is a globally significant wetland, a massive carbon storehouse, and 
a landscape that has sustained the traditional ways of life of various Anishinaabe and Anishini 
peoples since time immemorial.26 
 
The Ring of Fire, despite the recent downturn in global commodity prices, is often expected to be 
the main driver of Ontario’s economy over the next several decades.27 Despite the near 
continuous pressure from exploration companies, if a major mining hub does materialize it will 
present an enormous departure from the current reality. Except for the soon-closing De Beers’ 
Victor mine, an open-pit diamond mine midway up the James Bay coast near Attawapiskat, all of 
Ontario’s far north has been basically ‘off-limits’ to major industry.28 The discovery of a 
commercially-viable source of chromite in the Ring of Fire is poised to change this. Chromite is 
a relatively rare but necessary component of stainless steel not produced anywhere else in North 
America.29 J.P. Restoule et al. describe the context as one in which the region is coming to be 
seen from the outside as a “new frontier for extractive development” at the same time as it is also 
experiencing a “resurgence of Indigenous identities and cultural practices” from within.30 
 
The authors are settler academics who teach in a law faculty in Toronto. The team consists of 
university-based legal researchers working with experienced community-based researchers, 
advocates and intellectuals who belong to northern communities, and who provide strategic 
guidance and analysis.  Our collaborations grew out of other work stemming from our common 
                                                 
24 Our approach to legal pluralist theory, focused on tracking (and arguing for) shifts in the type of relationship between legal 
orders, specifically from a combative or competitive relationship to a more cooperative one, here borrows some of its vocabulary 
from Geoffrey Swenson, “Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice” (2018) 20 Int’l Studies Rev 438. 
25 The Far North Science Advisory Panel, “Science for a Changing North: The Report of the Far North Science Advisory Panel” 
(2010) Toronto, Canada: A report submitted to the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources [Far North Science Advisory Panel, 
“Science for a Changing North”]; Chetkiewicz, Cheryl & Anastasia M. Lintner, “Getting it Right in Ontario’s Far North: The 
Need for a Regional Strategic Environmental Assessment in the Ring of Fire [Wawangajing]” (2014), online: 
<https://www.wcscanada.org/Portals/96/Documents/RSEA_Report_WCSCanada_Ecojustice_FINAL.pdf>.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Mineral exploration in the Ring of Fire discovered the potential of $60 billion worth of nickel, chromite and other minerals, 
enough to “support mining operations for a hundred years”, see Jessica Gamble, “What’s at stake in Ontario’s Ring of Fire”, 
Canadian Geographic (24 August 2017), online: <https://www.canadiangeographic.ca/article/whats-stake-ontarios-ring-fire >.  
28 Peter Gorrie, “The Ring of Fire” Ontario Nature Magazine (31 August 2010) (Ontario Nature Magazine) online: 
http://onnaturemagazine.com/the-ring-of-fire.html at 2 [Gorrie, “The Ring of Fire”].  
29 Ibid. 
30 Jean-Paul Restoule et al “Learning from place: A return to Traditional Mushkegowuk ways of knowing” (2013) 36.2 Canadian 
Journal of Education 68 at 73. See also Daigle, “Awawanenitakik”, supra note 21. 
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interests and political commitments around advancing Indigenous jurisdiction and environmental 
stewardship. Our work together thus far has consisted of a year of background preparation and 
relationship-building, consisting mainly of short meetings in Thunder Bay, joint conference 
presentations, and guest lectures by the community-based researchers in Toronto;  a second year 
of several longer community visits throughout the north consisting of workshops, feasts, 
interviews, time with elders, focus groups and trips out onto the land; followed by a third year of 
sustained writing and reflection. We were in Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwg (KI) in August 2017 
and August 2018.  
 
The 2017 workshops took place over a five day visit to the community in August. We were 
invited to facilitate a discussion in the community that reflected on the decade ‘since Platinex’, in 
order to help to prepare community members for some internal strategic planning meetings that 
would follow our workshops. We received ethics approval from York University’s Office of 
Research Ethics Human Participants Review Committee, and discussed the parameters for the 
workshops, including ownership and control of data, community control over outputs, and 
possible publications, with the community leadership in advance of the visits, again upon arrival 
and with all of the community participants at the beginning of the workshops.31  Our intention 
with this research is to find ways of honouring these principles by employing methodologies that 
are concerned with building and sustaining respectful, reciprocal relations, as well as generating 
research outputs that are useful to communities and their advocates in the far north. 
 
As part of our commitments to attempt to make our work useful to communities and advocates in 
the far north, we engage in a number of tangential activities with community-based partners as 
well. These emerge out of iterative, evolving relationships and understandings, and include 
contributing legal research memos, filing access-to-information requests, contacting government 
officials, facilitating travel of community members, and supporting community delegations for 
alliance-building, public awareness and fundraising efforts. It also includes making accessible, 
timely interventions into relevant public policy debates. We engage in these activities out of 
ethical commitments to reciprocity and mutual aid, knowing that, in the end, it may be 
impossible to make this research as valuable to communities on the ground as it is to the 
university-based researchers. Thus, while our approach to the research is informed by the 
Ownership, Control, Access and Possession (OCAP) principles governing research by and with 
Aboriginal peoples, as well as the Tri-Council’s Chapter 9, in the end, to a greater extent than 
may ever be possible through a university-based research ethics protocol, we are held 
accountable through these ongoing relationships. 
 
We met with Band members, council members, elders and youth in the community’s hall. We 
provided food and coffee for participants, and others just dropping by. We provided honoraria 
for elders and knowledge holders. The entire discussion progressed relatively slowly, as all 
comments, whether offered in English or Oji-Cree, were repeated in the other language by 
community translators. Everything was recorded by audio-and video-recorders. The video-
recordings were kept by the community for their own use, and the audio-recordings were shared 
                                                 
31 Band Council of KI approved these parameters, but there is no formalized ‘research ethics’ review procedure in place in KI. In 
terms of a report-back mechanism, leadership changed in KI during the sustained period of refection and writing in year 3 of this 
project. Relationships with community-based researchers continued, and we were able to make contact and share a draft of this 
article with the new leadership prior to publication of this article. 
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with our team so that we could produce transcripts. The transcription of the days’ discussions 
was also offered to the community in the months following the workshops.32 The second day of 
workshops culminated in a community feast and an exchange of gifts. Our team was also given 
the opportunity to spend time out on the land, travelling to a family’s island cabin by boat, eating 
trout fried over a fire, and canoeing along some of Big Trout Lake’s sandy beaches. 
 
The specific research questions that we take up in this article are best conceived as having 
emerged from those workshop conversations, rather than as having been a pre-determined 
priority of the community. Framing the endeavour as one in which we work with principles of 
treaty re-invigoration to produce ‘one law’ inclusive of settler and Indigenous legal orders, 
emerges both from the indelible mark that the Platinex dispute has left in KI and from the flavour 
of the jurisprudence that flowed from that conflict. In other words, we do not adhere strictly to 
the notion that community-based research questions must always originate with the community 
members and their priorities alone. Instead, we embrace the questions that emerged out of our 
interactions with the community and its priorities, in combination with our own inquiries and 
preoccupations. We believe in the generative potential of this approach in the context of shared 
commitments and ongoing relations. 
 
Part II: Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninnuwug Against the State33 
 
Translator: “[the elder] is saying that she recognizes the struggle that we have in regards to 
resource development and we’ve already gone through one with Platinex and there’s going to be 
others coming. The problem is we own this land, we were born and raised here, this was given to 
us including all the river systems. These are ours.”34 
 
The community of KI is located on the northern shores of Big Trout Lake, a very large 
headwater lake in the far northwest of Ontario.35 Many small streams flow into the lake from the 
south, and the lake’s waters eventually flow onwards towards Hudson Bay. The landscape is 
muskeg and boreal forest, punctuated by the occasional high ridge and sandy beach.  The people 
of KI view these interlocking streams and water bodies as all connected, and this interconnection 
ensures that the land, as an indivisible whole, remains healthy.  Days range from long and warm, 
to cold and short over the six seasons in the Oji-Cree calendar.  For most of the year, the 
community is reachable only by air; there is an ice road that connects with provincial highways 
                                                 
32 The transcripts were reviewed to pull out quotes that are illustrative of the points being made; they were not systematically 
analysed for themes. As a result of the workshop format, the identities of the speakers were not discernible from the transcripts. 
Thus, we have taken the decision here not to attribute the remarks to specific individuals, nor to try to indicate systematically 
which remarks have been made by which speakers. Where possible, we do offer cues in the text so as to try to give the reader a 
sense of the extent to which a diversity of views existed on a particular point. We do indicate where the remark being reproduced 
is one that is a translation from Oji-Cree made contemporaneously. Approximately 40 people from KI participated, including 6 
elders (3 of whom made extensive remarks), 3 members of the KI6, and 4 members of the then-Band council. Quotes from the 
workshops are set apart from the main text and printed in italics. In each corresponding footnote, we indicate the date and session 
of the workshop that the remark was made, and the time mark on the transcript. Transcripts are on file with authors.  
33 Drawing a deliberate parallel to Shiri Pasternak’s framing in Grounded Authority: Barriere Lake Against the State (University 
of Minnesota Press, 2017). As we describe later in this section, Pasternak’s analysis, demonstrating how the contemporary state’s 
refusal to recognize the inherent governing authority of Indigenous peoples produces attempts to perfect its sovereignty by 
replacing Indigenous jurisdiction with a form of delegated state jurisdiction, aptly describes Ontario’s approach to land-use 
planning in the far north. 
34 Community member, KI workshop, August 28, 2017, morning session (1:18:40). 
35 KI First Nation occupies reserve number 84, which is approximately 29,940 hectares in size. As of May 2017, there were a 
total of 1,692 people registered with the band: 1,139 living on reserve, 29 on other reserves, and 521 living off reserve. 
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for a few short weeks in winter, and a permanent road that connects KI with a neighboring First 
Nation.  
 
The languages spoken in the community are Anishininiimowin (commonly ‘Oji-Cree’) and 
English. Oji-Cree, or in the community’s parlance ‘the language’, ingrains the land into the 
people’s lives and identities.36  Most of the community elders speak very little or no English, and 
many people are bilingual. Younger people in the community are educated in English, although 
most continue to understand Oji-Cree. People continue to live off the land in KI, as many people 
hunt, fish, and trap in the same way their ancestors have for centuries.37   
 
“The community is able to survive off of the land due to their relationship with it – it is 
not a passive resource from which certain things can be taken, nor is it an object to be 
managed by cutting it up into discrete parts such as trees, plants, minerals, rocks, water, 
and animals. The land provides because of how it is – as a holistic, interconnected system 
in which every part plays a vital role towards the survival of the people.”38   
 
The community’s traditional legal system is referred to as Kanawayandan D’aaki. It provides for 
a duty to take care of the land.  It translates to “looking after my land” and “keeping my land”.39 
It is a sacred responsibility, passed down from generation to generation, and it is a duty that is 
regarded in KI as having ensured the survival of the people.40   
 
KI is a party to the Treaty 9 Adhesion which was signed at Big Trout Lake in July 1929. As 
Rachel Ariss and John Cutfeet explain,  
 
“The Treaty Commission arrived in Big Trout Lake with the papers already completed, 
minus the signatures – and the paper written in English only. Although the document 
itself was not translated at the signing, the words spoken at the time were translated, and 
that is what KI understood to be the content of those documents. The oral agreement is 
the basis for sharing the land and “all that it possesses”….The oral agreement continues 
to shape the community’s understanding of the relationship between KI, Ontario, and 
Canada – a relationship of sharing between equal partners, neither an extinguishment of 
their title, nor an ending of their relationship of protection and responsibility to the 
land”.41 
 
KI’s understanding of Treaty 9 is reflected in the community’s Consultation Protocol that sets 
out how to build community consensus on development projects that would reflect the 
community members’ duties under Kanawayandan D’aaki. The KI leadership created this 
protocol after becoming aware of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate where treaty 
rights may be impacted through Crown activity, and intended it to apply to “all external parties”, 
                                                 
36 See for example, Dianne Hiebert and Marj Heinrichs, with the People of Big Trout Lake, We are One with the Land. A History 
of Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (Kelowna: Rosetta Projects, 2007) [Hiebert & Heinrichs “We are One with the Land”].  
37 Ibid. 
38 Rachell Ariss & John Cutfeet, “Kitchenuhmaykoosib Ininuwug First Nation: Mining, Consultation, Reconciliation and Law” 
(2011) 10(1) Indigenous Law Journal 1-37 at 7 [Ariss & Cutfeet, “KI FN: Mining, Consultation, Reconciliation and Law”]. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ariss & Cutfeet, “KI FN: Mining, Consultation, Reconciliation and Law”, supra note 38 at 27. 
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including both development companies and the Crown.42  This context – the convergence of 
Kanawayandan D’aaki and constitutionally protected s. 35 rights – sets the context for the KI v 
Platinex dispute over land use and exploratory mining that informed the entire process of legal 
drafting that has transpired over the past decade. 
 
KI v Platinex 
 
KI is well-known in some legal circles in Canada for the strong stance that the community took 
in 2006 in defence of their authority to decide. The episode has been well-described in writings 
by Rachel Ariss and John Cutfeet, as well as by David Peerla.43 The basic facts are as follows. A 
junior mining company Platinex wanted to conduct exploratory drilling for minerals on KI lands, 
despite the fact that KI and other Treaty 9 nations had declared a moratorium on mining 
exploration in 2005.44 Ontario’s Mining Act was (and essentially still is) a ‘free-entry’ system, 
which at the time required no prior consultation to rights- or title holders (Indigenous or non-
Indigenous).45  The lands staked by Platinex were part of a Treaty Land Entitlement claim that 
KI had filed in 2000, seeking to expand their recognized land base, based on a claim that the 
Crown had not provided all of the reserve lands as promised.46  The KI community opposed the 
exploration and several leaders and community elders met the Platinex workers at their work 
camp on Nemeguisabins Lake, issued an ‘eviction order’ and waited for the company to leave.47  
The workers were eventually withdrawn by the company, in the presence of the OPP, and to 
Platinex’s disappointment, no criminal charges were laid against the land defenders. 
 
Platinex came back with a civil lawsuit against the community, claiming $10 billion in damages, 
and seeking an interlocutory injunction to prevent the community from interfering with its 
drilling program.48  This first court injunction was issued in the community’s favour, but it 
resulted in a court-mandated consultation period after which the expectation of the court was 
clearly that KI would have to concede to the exploration, perhaps with some accommodations to 
                                                 
42 Ariss & Cutfeet, “KI FN: Mining, Consultation, Reconciliation and Law”, supra note 38 at 16. See also Shin Imai, “Treaty 
Lands and Crown Obligations: The "Tracts Taken Up" Provision” (2001) 27:1 Queen’s LJ 1 [Imai, “Treaty Lands and Crown 
Obligations”]; John Long, “How the Commissioners Explained Treaty Number Nine to the Ojibway and Cree in 1905” (2006) 
98:1 Ontario History Volume 1 [Long “Treaty Number Nine”]. 
43 Rachel Ariss & John Cutfeet, Keeping the Land: Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug, Reconciliation and Canadian Law 
(Fernwood, 2012) [Ariss & Cutfeet, “Keeping the Land”]; Ariss & Cutfeet, “KI FN: Mining, Consultation, Reconciliation and 
Law”, supra note 38; David Peerla, “No Means No: The Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug and the Fight for Indigenous Resource 
Sovereignty” (2012), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2189897 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189897 [Peerla, 
“No Means No”]. Karen Drake and Shin Imai have also considered the conflict in more tangential ways in their scholarship: 
Karen Drake, “The Trials and Tribulations of Ontario’s Mining Act: The Duty to Consult and Anishinaabek Law” (2015) 11:2 
McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law & Policy 183 at 191 [Drake, “Trials and Tribulations”]; Imai, 
“Consult, Consent & Veto”, supra note 13.  
44 Peerla, “No Means No”, supra note 43 at 1. 
45 As will be explored more fully later, free entry provides that all Crown land is open to staking and exploration unless expressly 
excluded; that prospectors have the right of entry and access without notice or consultation; and that staking can result in claims 
being registered without any decision or discretion on the part of the Crown. On November 1, 2012 a new regulatory regime 
requiring a permit and consultation for early exploration came into effect in Ontario (Exploration Plans and Exploration Permits, 
O. Reg. 308/12). See also Dawn Hoogeveen, “Sub-surface Property, Free-entry Mineral Staking and Settler Colonialism in 
Canada” (2014) 47:1 Antipode; Dimitrios Panagos & J Andrew Grant, “Constitutional change, Aboriginal rights, and mining 
policy in Canada” (2013) 54:1 Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 405 at 407. 
46 Ariss & Cutfeet,  “KI FN: Mining, Consultation, Reconciliation and Law”, supra note 38 at 30-31. 
47 Peerla, “No Means No”, supra note 43 at 1; Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, [2006] 4 CNLR 152, 
[2006] OJ No. 3140 [Platinex 2006]. 
48 Platinex 2006, supra note 47; Ariss & Cutfeet, “Keeping the Land”, supra note 43 at 73.  
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address any specific concerns.49 The community did not change its stance, and this time the 
injunction went in the company’s favour – KI was ordered to provide the company with access to 
its “assets”.50  KI did not do so; instead, Platinex representatives were issued a trespass order 
when they attempted to land at the KI airstrip and were forced back on to the plane.  Soon after, 
the chief, some councilors and other community members set up a camp at Nemeguisabins 
Lake.51   
 
The actions resulted in the conviction of six community members on contempt of court charges 
and their sentencing to a period of imprisonment of six months.52 They became known as the 
KI6.53 The motions judge that issued the contempt of court ruling held that since the community 
is a signatory to historic Treaty 9, their rights are confined to those that were not explicitly given 
up in the treaty. Implicit in the judge’s opinion is that, having “surrendered” their lands, 
according to the written text of the treaty, KI is only entitled to consultation and accommodation. 
The motions judge’s ruling emphasized that the “rule of law” must be upheld – in other words, 
that the community must comply with the court’s order to give Platinex access to “its assets” on 
the land.54  This flew in the face of explicit testimony from leaders and elders that the KI6 were 
compelled under their own law, Kanawayandan D’aaki, to defend the land; they explained that 
they had obligations to protect it, which had been passed down from generation to generation.55  
 
Smith J. in 2008 stated that “contempt of court is the mechanism by which the law protects the 
authority of the court”.56  The court acknowledged that compliance with court orders is typically 
achieved through modest fines and incarceration is exceptionally rare.57  But here, the judge 
noted several aggravating factors: KI repeatedly and publicly stated its intention to defy the 
order; KI broadcasted its defiance and encouraged others; the symbolism of KI’s “collective 
defiance” by leaders was thought to be ‘especially dangerous’; and most remarkably, the court 
stated that “because the contemptors are impecunious, a fine is not a viable option”.58 
 
                                                 
49 Smith J held that KI could suffer irreparable harm from the drilling, because the community “may lose land that is important 
form a cultural and spiritual perspective. No award of damages could possibly compensate KI for this loss”: Platinex 2006, supra 
note 47 at para 79. 
50 Platinex representatives were issued a trespass order when they attempted to land at the KI airstrip and were forced back on to 
the plane. Platinex then requested a court order enjoining KI from blocking their drilling program. At the hearing for this order, in 
October, 2007, KI FN announced that they could no longer afford to participate in court proceedings in the Platinex dispute, and 
they walked away from court after 18 months of litigation and negotiations. The community’s position had not changed – they 
would not support any exploratory drilling by Platinex and would not negotiate the issue with Platinex. After walking away from 
court, the Judge issued an order prohibiting community members and supporters from interfering with or obstructing Platinex as 
they conducted their exploratory drilling on KI FN’s traditional territory. On October 25, KI FN publicly announced that Platinex 
would not be welcome in KI FN’s territory, and, as a result, Platinex brought a motion for civil contempt of court, see Chief and 
Council of KI, “Why We Are in Jail: From the Chief and Council of KI” (9 April 2008), Wii’nimkiikaa, online: < 
https://wiinimkiikaa.wordpress.com/2008/04/12/why-we-are-in-jail-from-the-chief-and-council-of-ki/>. 
51 Peerla, “No Means No”, supra note 43; Ariss & Cutfeet, “Keeping the Land”, supra note 43 at 82. 
52 Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, [2008] 2 CNLR 301, 165 ACWS 3d 656 (ONSC) [Platinex 
2008].   
53 The KI6 include Chief Donny Morris, deputy Chief Jack McKay, Cecilia Begg, Samuel McKay, Bruce Sakakeep, Darryl 
Sainnawap. 
54 Platinex 2006, supra note 47. 
55 Ariss & Cutfeet, “KI FN: Mining, Consultation, Reconciliation and Law”, supra note 38.  
56 Platinex 2006, supra note 47; Frontenac Ventures Corporation v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation, 2008 ONCA 534, 91 O.R. 
(3d) 1 [Frontenac]. 
57 Platinex 2006, supra note 47. 
58 Ibid. 
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The only mitigating factor was that none of the KI6 had any prior history.  Smith J concluded:  
 
“to allow a break of an order to occur with impunity by one sector of society will 
inevitably lead to a breach by others, or to the belief that the law is unjustly partial to 
those that have the audacity or persistence to flout it…if two systems of law are allowed 
to exist – one for the aboriginals and one for the non-aboriginals, the rule of law will be 
replaced by chaos”.59   
 
And finally, with respect to the justifications for their actions that the KI community members 
offered, he stated: “While I understand the principles and beliefs that the community members 
hold…the rule of law must be protected at all costs”.60 
 
The KI6 were asked to stand in a Thunder Bay courtroom full of their families who had travelled 
over days on winter roads to support them, and they were sentenced to 6 months in prison.61  In 
actual fact, the KI6 were released after 2 months on the consent of all parties.62 The appeal of 
their sentence had been combined with the case of Frontenac v Ardoch Algonquin at the Ontario 
Court of Appeal (OCA).63  The conflict in the Ardoch Algonquin case was based on a similar set 
of facts. The community had placed a moratorium on drilling and then physically (through a 
blockade of an access road), but peacefully, prevented the company from conducting the 
exploration work. In that case, the former Algonquin chief, Bob Lovelace, was the only one to 
testify. He was asked on cross-examination, “exactly where does the authority for the 
moratorium lie”?64  He answered, “With the elders, who talked to the people and the people 
made a decision”.65  The judge held: 
 
“Mr Lovelace says that while he respects the rule of law, he cannot comply because his 
Algonquin law is supreme. He says he finds himself in a dilemma… Sadly it is a 
dilemma of his own making. His apparent frustration with the Ontario government is no 
excuse for breaking the law. There can only be one law, and that is the law of Canada, as 
expressed through this court”.66 
 
On July 7, 2008, the KI6 were released from prison when the OCA found that the sentences 
imposed were too harsh, holding that the motions judge had not adequately considered all of the 
“dimensions of the rule of law that Canadian jurisprudence had set out, such as the need for 
reconciliation of competing rights and interests…” and that the motions judge should have done 
so earlier, perhaps at the injunction stage.67  But more crucially, the OCA made a comment about 
the way that the failure to consider the historical context would only further “exacerbate the 
estrangement of Aboriginal peoples from the Canadian justice system, and heighten their sense 
of “dislocation”.68  In other words, the court locates the problem in the past actions of the state, 
                                                 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ariss & Cutfeet, “Keeping the Land”, supra note 43. 
62 Platinex 2008, supra note 52.   
63 Frontenac, supra note 56.  
64 Ibid.   
65 Ibid.   
66 Ibid, at 14. Emphasis ours. 
67 Platinex 2006, supra note 47. 
68 Ibid. 
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rather than in a reading of Indigenous laws and legal orders and their integration within the 
meaning of the rule of law in Canada.  The broader problem with the lower court rulings, 
according to the OCA, was that the ‘contemptors’ saw no avenues of meaningful redress within 
the ‘Canadian’ legal system – not that they were fulfilling duties they saw as paramount under 
their own law.  It is a dissatisfying resolution that allowed the settler courts to make some gesture 
towards ‘reconciliation’, but from today’s vantage point, it fails completely to take on the 
fundamental questions raised by a parallel legal order containing norms that conflict with, or are 
incompatible with, the settler legal order.  
 
The Aftermath 
 
In the immediate fallout of the KI-Platinex and Frontenac-Ardoch disputes, the Mining Act in 
Ontario was amended and made marginally better, and the Far North planning regime was 
established with stated intention of introducing some control for remote northern communities in 
land-use planning across the region.69 In fact, mere months after the KI6 were released, when 
Platinex tried again to access its mining claims at Nemeguisabins Lake (which were still 
registered), KI again defended its jurisdiction, preventing the company’s plane from landing as 
members of KI circled in canoes and boats on the water below.  Eventually, Ontario paid 
Platinex $5 million to settle a lawsuit about the state’s failure to facilitate access to the 
company’s assets.  The deal removed the property Platinex had staked from mineral exploration; 
it was widely interpreted as the price of maintaining peace in the region.70  
 
While the KI-Platinex and Ardoch-Frontenac disputes had put the “free entry” system into the 
spotlight and the Court of Appeal judgment had made clear that the Mining Act, as it stood at the 
time of those disputes, was not upholding the Crown’s constitutional duties, the province was 
also reacting to other significant developments by effecting those legal changes: Ontario had 
moved from a “have” to a “have not” province; the Ring of Fire deposits had recently been 
quantified; environmentalists were pressuring the province to take steps to conserve the boreal 
forest for climate change mitigation purposes; and the Environmental Commissioner was 
pressuring the province to establish a comprehensive land-use planning process for the Far 
North.71 Ontario responded to this confluence of pressures with the introduction of the Far North 
                                                 
69 Drake, “Trials and Tribulations”, supra note 43 at 204. See also Far North Act 2010, SO 2010, c 18, s 9.  
70 Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, “Ontario Resolves Litigation Dispute Over Big Trout Lake Property” (14 
December 2009), online at: <https://news.ontario.ca/mndmf/en/2009/12/ontario-resolves-litigation-dispute-over-big-trout-lake-
property.html>. Ontario undertook to withdraw the lands from staking and mineral exploration for 25 years; the deal also entitled 
Platinex to receive a royalty of 2.5 per cent of any future mine developed on the staked lands. 
71 Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy, 2009, “Protecting the Far North: McGuinty Government Provides New Leadership 
Role for First Nations” Archived News Release accessed May 31, 2018 online:  <news.ontario.ca/mnr/en/2009/06/protecting-the-
far-north.html>; Allan Britnell, “Between a rock and a hard place” The Globe and Mail (May 14 2009), online: 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/article4273676/>; Rob Ferguson, “Ontario becoming a 
'have not'” Toronto Star (April 30, 2008), online: 
www.thestar.com/news/ontario/2008/04/30/ontario_becoming_a_have_not.html/;  Marilyn Scales, “Noront’s road to the Ring of 
Fire,” Canadian Mining Journal (February 1, 2017), online: www.canadianminingjournal.com/features/noronts-road-ring-fire/>; 
Deborah Zabarenko, “Politicians persuaded to save Canada boreal forest,” Reuters (November 19, 2008), online: 
www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-canada-boreal/politicians-persuaded-to-save-canada-boreal-forest-
idUSTRE4AI5IZ20081119; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Building Resilience: Annual Report 2008-2009 (October 
2009) at 42; Ontario, Ministry of Natural Resources, Far North of Ontario Land Use Planning Initiative (October 2, 2015); Far 
North Act, 2010, SO 2010, c 18, s 14(4) [Far North Act].  
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Act and various Mining Act amendments, widely interpreted as readying the Far North for 
extraction.72   
 
In the midst of this, trouble re-surfaced for KI in 2011 when the leadership learned that God’s 
Lake Resources, another mining company, had acquired new claims on its homelands. KI 
requested that a bilateral forum with Ontario be established to discuss community concerns 
regarding possible environmental contamination, impacts on Aboriginal and Treaty rights, and 
the security of a sacred and spiritual area amongst other things.  In July of that year, KI held a 
community referendum passing a Watershed Declaration and a Consultation Protocol, to be 
discussed more fully in the next section. In September, KI served a notice of eviction to God's 
Lake Resources for trespassing on KI's spiritual and sacred lands, and secured a meeting in 
November with officials from three Ontario Ministries on the idea of a bilateral panel. The 
position that Ontario took at the meeting, however, was that there was nothing it could do to 
prevent God’s Lake Resources from acting on their claims and leases: the government claimed to 
be powerless in the face of the free entry provisions of the Mining Act. A few months later, 
Ontario unilaterally withdrew over 23,000 square kilometers of the KI homelands from 
prospecting and mining claim staking and reached an agreement with God's Lake Resources in 
which the company surrendered its mining leases and claims in exchange for $3.5 million.  
 
Of course, much of the KI homelands remained open for staking, as did the traditional territories 
of other First Nations throughout the far North. It was into this context that Ontario introduced 
the Far North Planning Strategy with the stated aims of protecting 50% of the boreal forest, 
‘partnering’ with First Nations in decision-making and revenue-sharing, and allowing for new 
mining developments.73 In hindsight, many now see that while it was “lauded as an ecological 
victory” by some major conservation organizations, it was actually a development scheme 
designed to manage the increasingly troublesome claims to Indigenous governance authority 
across the region.74 Not surprisingly, the initiative failed to secure the support of the northern 
communities. Consultations were described as rushed and under-resourced, criticized for taking 
place outside of the region, and condemned for not living up to standards for genuine 
consultation.75 Ultimately, however, the problem is with the structure of the legislative regime 
and the broader set of assumptions upon which it is situated. 
 
As the Far North Act was implemented across northern Ontario, it became clear that the regime 
is a central plank in Ontario’s attempt to remedy the uncertainties of jurisdiction that were 
                                                 
72 While it was initially couched as part of the government’s plan to fight climate change, the province later shifted to promote 
the Act as part of its ‘Open Ontario Plan’ to strengthen the economy, with the government citing the “legislation’s importance for 
future mineral development, especially in the Ring of Fire.” see Christopher J A Wilkinson & Tyler Schulz, “Planning the Far 
North in Ontario, Canada: an Examination of the ‘Far North Act, 2010’” (2012) 32 Natural Areas Journal 310 at 311. See also: 
Isabelle Côté & Matthew I Mitchell, “The Far North Act in Ontario, Canada: a sons of the soil conflict in the making?” (2018) 
56:2 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 137. 
73  Government of Ontario, “Far North Land Use Strategy” (2015) Ontario.ca, online: <https://www.ontario.ca/page/far-north-
land-use-strategy>; Northwatch and MiningWatch Canada, The Boreal Below: Mining Issues and Activities in Canada’s Boreal 
Forest, (MiningWatch Canada, May 2008); “Ontario moves to protect boreal”, Montreal Gazette (14 July 2008), Canada.com 
online: <http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=f58e4ec3-d68b-4364-b607-67a23a1d548f >; Far North 
Science Advisory Panel, “Science for a Changing North”, supra note 25.  
74 Gorrie, “The Ring of Fire”, supra note 28.   
75 Ian Ross, “McGuinty’s Controversial Far North Act Passes” (November 2010), Northern Ontario Business, online: 
<https://republicofmining.com/2010/11/08/mcguintys-controversial-far-north-act-passess-ian-ross/>.  
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exposed in the KI struggle.76  Under the scheme, communities are given funding to create 
community-based land-use plans that map out in detail the historical and contemporary uses of 
various parts of their territories.77 Communities can identify areas of significant cultural value 
such as burial sites, waterways and travel routes to be protected, caribou migration routes, or 
fishing areas, and may designate such areas as open for — or closed to — mineral exploration.78 
The invitation to engage in mapping itself is not controversial; many communities were doing 
mapping already. But, under the Far North Act, the community-based land-use plans must be 
jointly approved by the First Nation and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry 
(MNRF). Once the final plan is approved, all decisions to authorize land-use activities must be 
“consistent with” the land-use designations specified in the plan.79  The kind of mapping that is 
encouraged through this process, however, largely accepts “colonial imaginaries of territory”: the 
boundaries between neighboring communities’ planning areas are conceived as hard and fixed, 
ignoring relations of kinship and the extensive social, political, and economic ties between 
nations.80 The designations are imagined as applying uniformly despite the variety of different 
motivations for, proponents of, or intensities of development that might be proposed within 
them.  In contrast, each community will have its own set of complex and nuanced mechanisms 
for authorizing various activities on the land that rely on their specific legal order: different 
family groups have authority over different parts of the territory based on the locations of 
harvesting areas, traplines, hunting camps and cabins. In KI, there are various protocols that exist 
under Kanawayandan D’Aaki for allowing access to outsiders, for sharing resources, and for 
managing conflict; the elders hold a vast pool of knowledge about how those principles apply. 
For these reasons, communities are suspicious of the land-use planning exercise, reasoning that 
Ontario must hope to gain access to all of this knowledge — and then to bring the community’s 
authority to make decisions, its de facto governance of the territory, under Ontario’s 
jurisdiction.81 As the Nishnawbe Aski Nation (NAN)82 complained at the time of the Act’s 
passing, “[despite the fact that the] Act is aimed specifically at First Nations in [NAN], who are 
the sole occupants of this isolated/remote area of northern Ontario”, the scheme was introduced 
in the face of the unanimous and fundamental objections of the NAN people.83 
 
The FNA ultimately gives the government unilateral power to approve mining developments and 
override community land use plans if the “social and economic interests of Ontario” are 
engaged.84 In other words, it presents a good example of the contemporary state tactic Shiri 
                                                 
76 John Cutfeet, personal communication.  
77 Far North Act, supra note 71, ss 7 (4)(b)(i) and 9(20); funds to engage in the traditional land-use mapping exercise and for 
documenting the elders knowledge is available only to those Bands that agree to surrender to the MNRF process. It is possible, 
however, for Bands to withdraw at the end of any of the prescribed five stages. 
78 Far North Act, supra note 71, ss 6, 9(9) and 14.  
79 Accordingly, any “development” would have to be approved by minister’s order if no community-based land-use plan is in 
place, see Far North Act, supra note 71, s 12(2). 
80 Daigle, “Awawanenitakik”, supra note 21 at 267. 
81 Dayna Nadine Scott, “Confusion and concern over land-use planning across northern Ontario” The Conversation (March 11, 
2018), online: <https://theconversation.com/confusion-and-concern-over-land-use-planning-across-northern-ontario-92704>. 
82 According to its website, NAN is “a political territorial organization representing 49 First Nation communities within northern 
Ontario with the total population of membership (on and off reserve) estimated around 45,000 people.  These communities are 
grouped by Tribal Council (Windigo First Nations Council, Wabun Tribal Council, Shibogama First Nations Council, 
Mushkegowuk Council, Matawa First Nations, Keewaytinook Okimakanak, and Independent First Nations Alliance) according to 
region.  Six of the 49 communities are not affiliated with a specific Tribal Council”. KI is one of those independent First Nations. 
See Nishnawbe Aski Nation “About Us”, online: <http://www.nan.on.ca/article/about-us-3.asp>.  
83 Nishnawbe Aski Nation, “Ontario’s Far North Act”, online: <http://www.nan.on.ca/article/ontarios-far-north-act-463.asp>. 
84 Far North Act, supra note 71, s 12(4). 
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Pasternak describes: an attempt by the Crown to replace the inherent jurisdiction of Indigenous 
peoples with a form of delegated state authority.  As we detail in Part III of this paper, genuine 
joint-decision-making in which final authority is shared – of the kind that KI proposed in 2011 – 
would be a basic element of a renewed treaty relationship giving rise to “one law” for the far 
North. 
 
Looking Back, Looking Forward: KI Reflects on the Experience a Decade Later 
 
As mentioned, leadership of the KI community invited our research team in 2017, in the context 
of renewed mining pressure in the region, to join them for workshops in advance of a strategic 
planning session, and they indicated an interest in reflecting on where they have come in the 
decade since their fight with Platinex. Despite the fact that the community had spent the 
intervening years engaged in an intense process of legal drafting, releasing a Watershed 
Declaration, and a Governance Framework, amongst other documents, they asked: “Would we 
be any better off today?  Are we in a better position now to withstand pressure from resource 
companies who want to access our territory?” 
 
Reflecting on the past decade in legal scholarship and Indigenous activism, we acknowledge a 
remarkable resurgence and revitalization of Indigenous laws across the country. Over that period, 
the scholarship of John Borrows contributed immensely to the changing legal landscape in 
Canada.85  Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland foregrounded a method for approaching 
Indigenous narratives as caselaw and taking seriously the legal principles they contain86; the 
Indigenous Law Research Unit at the University of Victoria further developed this method in 
close collaboration, and at the service of communities seeking to revitalize, ‘ascertain and 
articulate’ their laws.87 Numerous other communities worked with emerging and established 
legal scholars and other thinkers across the country, resulting in a growing body of new 
resources concerning the diverse Indigenous laws and legal traditions composing Canada.  
 
In addition to this vibrant body of research and scholarly work, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission issued its Final Report and Calls to Action – one of which, #28, calls on Canadian 
law schools to offer courses touching on ‘Indigenous law’, among other topics.88   Most 
importantly, Indigenous communities across the country have felt increasingly empowered to 
invoke their own legal orders to assert jurisdiction, and to evaluate proposed resource extraction 
projects themselves – forcing an interaction with the settler legal system.89 Whether the 
                                                 
85 John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University of Toronto Press, 2010); John Borrows, Drawing out Law: A 
Spirit’s Guide, (University of Toronto Press, 2010).  
86 Hadley Friedland & Val Napoleon, “Gathering the Threads: Developing A Methodology For Researching And Rebuilding 
Indigenous Legal Traditions”, (2015-2016) 1:1 Lakehead Law Journal. 
87 Indigenous Law Research Unit, “About Us”, online: 
<https://www.uvic.ca/law/about/indigenous/indigenouslawresearchunit/index.php>. 
88 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to Action” (2015), 
online: <http://trc.ca/assets/pdf/Calls_to_Action_English2.pdf> 
; The Canadian Council of Law Deans reports here on the various initiatives undertaken in Canadian law schools in response: 
(2018), online: <https://ccld-cdfdc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CCLD-TRC-REPORT-V2.pdf>. 
89 In Secwepemc Territory in British Columbia, the Indigenous Network on Economies and Trade undertook its own Indigenous 
risk assessment of Kinder Morgan Canada’s Trans Mountain Expansion Project that said failing to take into account Indigenous 
jurisdiction, title and land rights was too great a risk for the expansion project to access Indigenous lands and resources, see 
Secwepemcul’Ecw Assembly “Trans Mountain Expansion Project and Investors Continue to Face Untenable Risk for Failing to 
Recognize Indigenous Jurisdiction” (April 13, 2018) online: https://www.secwepemculecw.org/risk-assessment;  In British 
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articulation of Indigenous law in new and different forms – including written forms – is the best 
approach to revitalizing Indigenous laws and legal orders, or whether instead investing in land-
based practices of resurgence is a preferable course of action, in light of the ongoing pressures on 
communities and their lands, is a matter of continuing debate within communities and among 
scholars.90 In many communities, as in KI, these two broad strategies go hand in hand: John 
Cutfeet describes how ‘practicing Kanawayandan D’aaki’, learning how to live and survive on 
the land, is crucial to respecting it. 
 
Within the KI community, it was the dispute with Platinex that precipitated the exercise in legal 
drafting.  In opening up an opportunity to reflect on the community’s work over the past decade, 
it was clear even ten years after the KI6 were jailed, that the people remember the moment of the 
sentencing very clearly.  One community member stated,  
 
“…after the fiasco of Platinex, during the proceedings against our people, there were 
several occasions when the judge publicly stated that there cannot be two laws. Right off 
the bat, our governance is not recognized. Our sovereignty is not recognized. Our 
jurisdiction over land and resources is not recognized. Then how can you have a 
relationship with a nation with who you signed treaties?”91  
 
A member of the KI6 stated:  
 
“[a Crown lawyer] was really trying to convince me in order to avoid going to jail that I 
would agree not to break their law. And I told him I understand and recognize the law 
and yes, I am breaking the law by doing what I am doing and I said “there is a higher 
law that I respect more, which comes from the Creator. You can lock me up for breaking 
their law, you could kill me physically for breaking their law, but I am more afraid of 
breaking the Creator’s law because he could destroy my physical being and spiritual 
being. That’s what I’m afraid of. You can lock me up if you want.” And he did not have 
an answer for that when I told him that, when I was prepared to go to jail….”92 
 
“This is the belief of our people here at KI. There is a higher law than Canadian law. 
And that’s the conflict that we’re in. We are starting to, even though we [didn’t] have 
written law as Indigenous law, we [had] the strong beliefs that we are willing to sacrifice 
our freedom to uphold, lay our lives down to uphold. But now we are in the process of 
documenting our laws, whether they recognize them or not…the Canadian government 
                                                 
Columbia, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation invoked their legal order by completing an Independent Assessment of the Trans Mountain 
Expansion Project using their own legal principles, traditional knowledge, community engagement, and expert evidence on 
human and biophysical health impacts, anthropology and archaeology, see Jessica Clogg et al., “Indigenous Legal Traditions 
 and the Future of Environmental Governance in Canada” (2016) 29 J Enc L & Prac 227 [Clogg “Indigenous Legal Traditions 
and Environmental Governance”]. Clogg et al. (2016) also cite the Yinka Dene Alliance as an example of a First Nation’s 
willingness to enforce their own legal orders in court, the boardroom and on the land. That vigour led in part to the failure of 
Enbridge to carry out the Northern Gateway pipeline project.  
90 On resurgence, see Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Don Mills, ON: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Taiaiake Alfred, Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Peterborough, ON: Broadview 
Press, 2005); Taiaiake Alfred, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism” (2005) 40:4 Government and 
Opposition 597; Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, “Indigenous Resurgence and Co-Resistance” (2016) 2:2Journal of the Critical 
Ethnic Studies Association 19.  
91 Community member, KI workshop, August 28, 2017, morning session (44:26). 
92 Community member, KI workshop, August 25, 2017, morning session (1:35:30). 
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and industry. These are our laws. We have ownership of these laws and we will uphold 
these. You don’t have to like it [but] we do believe we are a sovereign nation here at 
KI.”93 
 
Yet another member stated:  
 
“This is really important for us as a people of KI that we understand our rights given by 
the Creator and we uphold them, and we stand on them and honour them even if it means 
breaking the Canadian law.”94 
 
We learned that community members in KI had heard the message that the Canadian legal 
system could not see, recognize nor respect Kanawayandan D’Aaki, and that they had responded 
by getting to work trying to articulate it in ways the settler system would understand.95  In the 
course of the workshop, then-Chief James Cutfeet described what the community terms the 
“operational documents”: the various legal materials that KI has produced in the years since the 
dispute.96 The documentation includes:   
 
1. Maps. These depict who lived where, what activities they engaged in to live off the land, who 
trapped or fished where, the locations of cabins etc.; 
2. Treaty affidavits. In the affidavits that were sworn, 14 elders relayed their relations’ recollections 
of what was exchanged in the treaty 1905/1906, signed affidavits, which were legally stamped;  
3. Consultation Protocol;  
4. Water Declaration;   
5. Governance Framework; and  
6. Declaration of Sovereignty and Governance and Assertion of Inherent and Treaty Rights. 
The “Consultation Protocol” and the Governance Framework were intended to guide the 
community’s process for collaborating with other levels of government, and to “inform the 
allowable activities that can be taken by non-Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug peoples upon the 
homelands, the processes that are required allowing such activities and the authority and 
jurisdiction exercised by Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug.”97 Similarly, the Watershed 
Declaration (2011) provides notice that Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug peoples recognize their 
own ‘rights and responsibilities’ to defend the lands and waters. It states:  
 
“The Big Trout Lake, our home lake, is a living system that reaches far beyond its shores. 
It interacts with the rivers and streams that feed and drain it, the land whose waters flow 
into those rivers, the wetlands and muskeg which breathe, the rains, the winds, the 
underground seams and spring sources, the ice, snow and frost. It provides clean drinking 
water for all life, habitat for the fish and water life, food and travel ways for our people, 
and moisture for the air. 
 
                                                 
93 Community member, KI workshop, August 25, 2017, morning session (1:45). 
94 Community member, KI workshop, August 25, 2017, morning session (1:53:30). 
95 The community’s ‘operational documents’ are available in Ojibway syllabics and in English. 
96 A version of the Consultation Protocol was in place before the dispute with Platinex. 
97 Ibid. 
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We announce and proclaim our role as the First peoples of this territory – the original 
caretakers – with rights and responsibilities to defend and ensure the protection, 
availability and purity of the water for the survival of the present and future generations, 
and for all life. By the authority and responsibility given to us by the Creator we are 
going to make decisions related to the waters. We declare all waters that flow into and 
out of Big Trout Lake and all lands whose waters flow into those lake, rivers and 
wetlands, to be completely protected through our continued care under KI’s authority, 
laws and protocols”.98 
 
In 2016, KI issued a “Declaration of Sovereignty and Governance and Assertion of Inherent and 
Treaty Rights”.99 Directly referencing the community’s conflict with Platinex, then-Chief Cutfeet 
stated that the community was working with the government on an agreement to recognize KI’s 
right to self-determination and recognition of responsibilities to its homelands. The Declaration 
is thought to be “anchored” in the set of sworn treaty affidavits from elders about their 
understanding of the treaty relationship with the Crown, and in the extensive maps of traditional 
and continuing land use.100  
 
A Press Release from the KI Chief and Council explains the motivation for engaging in the 
drafting of their laws as follows: 
 
“As a component of the right to self-determination and recognition of our responsibilities 
to our KI Homelands, which provides KI with its life and identity, the KI Chief and 
Council declared that KI going forward will use its laws, and principles of 
sustainability…cognizant of its special relationship with our [lands], to determine any 
developments or use of the KI Homelands”.101 
 
Several community members expressed the view that the process of legal drafting was a way of 
putting governments and industry “on notice” of their laws.  In this vein, one community 
member stated, “We are not going to allow somebody to come and push [us] around on [our] 
own land, tell [us] what to do, give [us] laws.  We have our own.”102 Others felt it was a way of 
translating or explaining to the settler system “how things work” on their territory. Some 
community members, however, expressed skepticism of whether the process of codification of  
 
KI law could even make a difference. As an example: 
 
“Now the lack of recognition of the KI documents is another issue because the courts 
have already stated you cannot have two laws in one land. We know the law in Canada 
from their perspective is going to be the one that is always in place. How do we overcome 
that? The major challenge is that they will not give up their jurisdiction or power and 
                                                 
98 Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug Watershed Declaration (2011), online: <http://wildlandsleague.org/media/WildNotes_Winter-
2013-KI-Watershed.pdf>. 
99 Jody Porter, “Northern Ontario First Nation vows to use its own laws to control traditional lands” (9 August 2016) CBC News, 
online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/first-nation-land-management-law-1.3712136>. 
100 Ibid. 
101 KI Chief and Council, Press Release, Declaration of Sovereignty and Governance and Assertion of Inherent and Treaty 
Rights, August 4, 2016, Big Trout Lake, Ontario. 
102 Community member, KI workshop, August 25, 2017, morning session (1:53:30). 
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authority by letting us assert the documents that we have. There will always be an 
ongoing battle. No matter how you cut it, we’ve seen First Nations across Canada take 
their cases to the Supreme Court of Canada and win, and none of those have been 
implemented to the full extent that they should be implemented…. The lands and 
resources form the basis of our foundation as a nation and that’s what we’re trying to 
protect. But I don’t believe in negotiating with the government after what I went 
through.”103 
 
We were struck by the extent to which the discussion in KI resonated with the scholarly debates 
on the tensions around writing down sacred laws.  As scholars have articulated, Indigenous 
jurisprudence derives from teachings, customs and practices that are communicated ideally 
through a complex and interlocking set of processes, such as storytelling and perception – using 
the entire sensory spectrum to communicate legal meanings which are obviously impossible to 
translate into words, especially in English.104 As one member stated,  
 
“We’ve always said that we are oral people and beginning to document the traditional 
knowledge of our people puts us at risk once again or puts our culture at risk. My own 
perspective is that once we start documenting our traditional knowledge, we put 
ourselves in a compromising position... Where does that lead us? I perceive ways that 
this process weakens us as a nation when we follow what the law says when it only goes 
by what is documented. I am of the opinion that the knowledge of our elders has as much 
power and authority as is written in law…Are we going to import our own laws into their 
system just to accommodate them? Or do we keep what we have? If there’s no 
reconciliation, how do we work together and move forward?... That’s the risk. To suggest 
we start documenting our laws, we opened up the door to be a part of a system of which 
we are not and we have no say in the development of that system and we were the victims 
of that system.”105 
 
Recognizing that written English is not the ideal medium, many scholars nevertheless believe 
that translation into text is necessary; John Borrows, as an example, argues that translation will 
allow Indigenous legal traditions to come into conversation with common and civil law 
traditions.106 Sylvia McAdams argues that the Nêhiyaw legal traditions need to be written down 
because the language itself is disappearing and the knowledge should not also be lost.107 This 
view was also expressed in KI: 
 
[translator] “The elder is saying that [there is one type of] sovereignty, what people want 
to understand as when you write something, and it is in letter form, but the true 
sovereignty is what the Creator gave us. We have it already, we don’t have to write it. 
That’s why we decided one day we’ll start writing things now. There were about 6 things 
we did. Then we did the affidavits too. We understand our idea of the treaty but we never 
had it in writing, so we did that…. We believe what we believe as a people. To let the 
                                                 
103 Community member, KI workshop, August 28, 2017, morning session (44:26). 
104 See for example, Clogg, “Indigenous Legal Traditions and Environmental Governance”, supra note 90.   
105 Community member, KI Workshop, August 25, 2017, afternoon session (53:50). 
106 John Borrows, “Heroes, Tricksters, Monsters, and Caretakers: Indigenous Law and Legal Education” (2016) 61:846 McGill L. 
J. 795. 
107 Sylvia McAdam, Nationhood Interrupted: Revitalizing nêhiyaw Legal Systems, (UBC Press, 2015). 
22 
 
other side know this is where we come from because they only understand the writing on 
the paper...”108  
 
The understanding we came away from the community workshops with was that 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug people understood that it might matter to the settler legal 
system that they had gone through the process of drafting their laws and writing them down in 
English, but they understood and communicated clearly that it did not matter to them; in other 
words, the process of writing down in no way altered their sacred laws or their relationship to the 
land.  
 
A participant in the drafting process in KI reminded us that the impetus to do legal drafting 
“always comes from trouble”.109 All law is a product of its time and place.110 Just as is the case 
for settler law, words on a page are drafted to solve certain pressing problems; they emerge from 
a particular historical and political context. The language used may be abstract, imagined to 
apply to a broader set of circumstances than the current ‘mischief’ they are meant to address, but 
the underlying motivations infuse the page.  Similarly, settler law casts a long shadow in KI, and 
the settler colonial context inevitably influenced the drafters in what could only be a strategic 
engagement.  Overall, however, the sense we took from the time in KI was that the community 
had engaged in the exercise of legal drafting in order to assert their jurisdiction, to generate 
respect for their own legal order and demand that it be respected alongside the settler order. And 
while the people of KI will continue to enact Kanawayandan D’Aaki regardless of whether their 
jurisdiction is acknowledged by the Crown, their efforts at legal drafting reveal what a renewed 
treaty relationship – one presenting a way forward for all the beneficiaries of Treaty 9, including 
the Crown – might look like. 
 
Part III: Reinvigorating Treaty No.9 
 
“They negotiated that treaty. That’s a very powerful statement, those three things. As long as the 
sun shines, the river runs, and the grass grows. These three things they used because our people 
and at the times our elders were around, these things you could see. They were very powerful. At 
that time, our people trusted…When these treaty negotiators came here, our elders believed what 
they were told by them. Our elders were very trusting because somebody’s word was very 
powerful. Whatever a person said, they would have to stand by… That was then.”111  
 
The above-described legal drafting done by the KI community over the last decade finds its place 
in an equally evolving settler legal landscape. The community asked us to reflect on those 
changes, and how they articulate with the community’s work to spell out aspects of their own 
law. What threads of settler law and legal thought can Indigenous communities currently draw 
on to assert their jurisdiction on historic treaty territory? In our opinion, a Canadian judge faced 
with the assertion that an Indigenous community’s commitments and responsibilities under their 
own law compels them to oppose the enforcement of Canadian law on their territory, would now, 
a decade after Platinex, be equipped with  doctrine and jurisprudence that would allow her 
                                                 
108 Community member, KI Workshops, August 28, 2017, afternoon session (1:07:20). 
109 Personal communication, January 22, 2019, notes on file with authors. 
110 John Borrows, “Indigenous Legal Traditions” (2005) Journal of Law & Policy at 192 [Borrows “Indigenous Legal 
Traditions”]. 
111 Community member, KI Workshops, August 25, 2017, afternoon session (1:28:45). 
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approach the resolution of this conflict differently than by doubling down on the imposition of 
settler law. If there can only be “one law” on treaty territory, it must be treaty law.  
 
In this section, we explore the conundrum of historic treaties, and explore what would be 
required in order for Treaty 9 to help resolve situations where one group relies on Indigenous law 
to refuse a project, while another seeks to apply settler law to approve it. In other words, we ask: 
how can historic treaties be given meaning today so as to resolve conflicts of laws, by assisting 
in articulating ‘one law’ authoritative from both settler and Indigenous legal perspectives? As 
mentioned, while the analysis in this section was generated out of the workshops in KI, and 
initiated by the community’s invitation to consider the impact of their legal drafting and its 
significance in light of the legal developments in the decade since Platinex, the ideas for moving 
forward offered in this section should not be taken as reflecting the community’s position. In Part 
III, we offer our own ideas, drawing on the workshop transcripts supplemented by other sources 
emanating from communities throughout Treaty 9, for moving forward in new directions towards 
a re-invigorated Treaty relationship. 
 
The conundrum of historic treaties 
 
The conundrum of historic treaties, simply put, is that their content is, generally speaking, neither 
wholly nor accurately captured by their written text – but that such text is the most readily 
accessible source for ascertaining their content and meaning. Let us speak to each part of those 
two related statements – as to the incomplete and misleading nature of historic treaty texts – in 
turn.  
 
The fact that their written text is skeletal, failing to provide a full account of the understanding 
reached by their signatories, and of the promises they exchanged, is the cause of most of the 
treaty jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada to date. As the Court puts it in the 2010 
case of Québec (AG) v. Moses, modern treaties such as the James Bay and Northern Québec 
Agreement considered in that case are  
 
“far more comprehensive in scope than either the treaties of peace and friendship or the 
numbered treaties considered by this Court in a number of cases in which the analytical 
framework for interpreting the historical treaties between certain First Nations, Canada 
and Great Britain was developed.” 112 
 
Binnie J. further highlights the vast gap between modern and historic treaties, noting: 
 
“In R. v. Badger, Cory J. pointed out that Aboriginal ‘treaties are analogous to contracts, 
albeit of a very solemn and special, public nature’ (para. 76). The contract analogy is 
even more apt in relation to a modern comprehensive treaty whose terms (unlike in 1899) 
are not constituted by an exchange of verbal promises reduced to writing in a language 
many of the Aboriginal signatories did not understand (paras. 52-53). The text of modern 
comprehensive treaties is meticulously negotiated by well-resourced parties. […] The 
importance and complexity of the actual text is one of the features that distinguishes the 
historic treaties made with Aboriginal people [sic] from the modern comprehensive 
                                                 
112 Québec (AG) v. Moses, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557, 2010 SCC 17 at para 98. 
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agreement or treaty, of which the James Bay Treaty was the pioneer. We should therefore 
pay close attention to its terms.”113 
 
Thus, rather than detailing, as do modern treaties, the respective jurisdiction, rights and 
obligations of the Crown and of Indigenous signatories – including decision-making processes 
regarding the care and use of the land, as well as the sharing of its wealth – the numbered treaties 
in particular focus on describing the boundaries of lands that the Crown purports to acquire from 
Indigenous signatories, and the modest, if not symbolic, counterpart offered in exchange. As 
such, the written component of Treaty 9 documents the “surrender” by Indigenous signatories of 
“all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever” to an area of almost 250 000 square miles in 
exchange for an initial “present” of $8 per person, followed by $4 per person yearly.  
 
The need to seek out what the non-drafting, non-English-speaking parties understood to be the 
terms of the relationship they were agreeing to, and to at least partially correct the imbalance of 
power between the signatories, gave rise to the following treaty interpretation principles, 
summed up by Justice McLachlin in Marshall (1999): treaties must be liberally construed, and 
ambiguities resolved in favour of the Indigenous signatories; courts must be sensitive to the 
cultural and linguistic differences between the parties; technical or contractual interpretations of 
treaty wording must be avoided, and so must interpretations that approach treaty rights as 
“static” or “frozen at the date of signature”.114 The same  jurisprudence states that “the goal of 
treaty interpretation is to choose from among the various possible interpretations of common 
intention the one which best reconciles the interests of both parties at the time the treaty was 
signed.”115 In this search for the common intention of the parties, the interpreter must presume 
that the Crown sought to behave honourably and with integrity – and thus exclude interpretations 
deemed incompatible with the “honour of the Crown”.116 But while construing the language of 
the written text “generously” in favour of Indigenous signatories, “courts cannot alter the terms 
of the treaty by exceeding what ‘is possible on the language’ or realistic.”117 
 
The application of these treaty interpretation principles has allowed Canadian courts to receive 
and take into consideration the evidence brought forth by Indigenous parties, in cases involving 
conflicts with the Crown regarding the interpretation of historic treaties.118 Such cases reveal a 
major gap between Indigenous perspectives regarding what they were agreeing to, on the one 
hand, and the textual content of the agreement as drafted by Crown representatives, on the other 
hand.  
 
Indeed, the historic treaty texts seek to convey the notion that the Crown is from then on, as it 
were, “in charge” – the governing authority, the one not only with ownership of the land, but 
with exclusive territorial jurisdiction. Rather than stating this explicitly or directly, the numbered 
                                                 
113 Ibid, at para 7. 
114 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 at para 78 [Marshall]. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Marshall, supra note 115. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Most recently in Restoule v. Canada (Attorney General) 2018 ONSC 114 [Restoule], but also Re Paulette et al. and the 
Registrar of Titles (No. 2) 91973] WWR 115, 42 DLR (3d) 8. See also R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 and R. v. Marshall, 
[1999] 3 SCR 456 for an outline of the legal tests.  
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treaties suggest it at various points in their text. A predominant example is that of the “take-up 
clause”, which reads as follows in Treaty 9:  
 
“And His Majesty the King hereby agrees with the said Indians that they shall have the 
right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract 
surrendered as heretofore described, subject to such regulations as may from time to time 
be made by the government of the country, acting under the authority of His Majesty, and 
saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up from time to time for 
settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes. [our emphasis]”119 
 
While this clause begins by protecting the right of Indigenous signatories and their descendants 
to continue living on and harvesting the land as they have always done, it also, in the same 
breath, seems to subject this right to the possibility of being curtailed at the sole discretion of the 
Crown. Similarly, while the Crown undertakes to provide for the education of Indigenous 
children in the territory of Treaty 9, the treaty provides discretion over whichever type of 
infrastructure and equipment that “may seem advisable to His Majesty’s government of Canada” 
toward fulfilling this promise. The language of the treaty also allows the Crown discretion over 
the size of reserve lands, which simply need “not to exceed in all one square mile for each family 
of five”, and grants “His Majesty” alone “the right to deal with any settlers within the bounds of 
any lands reserved for any band as He may see fit.”120  
 
Most strikingly, Treaty 9 speaks of the Indigenous peoples with whom the Crown is concluding 
the treaty – and who are therefore, throughout this exchange, implicitly recognized as peoples in 
the sense of this term at international law – simply as “Indians inhabiting the territory hereinafter 
described.” As the text unfolds, it refers to them as “His [Majesty’s] Indian people” and “His 
Indian subjects”. The treaty ends with a formal promise by “the undersigned Ojibeway [sic], 
Cree and other chiefs and headmen, on their own behalf and on behalf of all the Indians whom 
they represent” to “strictly observe this treaty, and also to conduct and behave themselves as 
good and loyal subjects of His Majesty the King”, and in particular to “obey and abide by the 
law”.121 Clearly, the ‘one law’ contemplated here is that emanating from the Crown. 
 
An emphasis on these aspects of the text is compatible with the evolution of the wider Canadian 
jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights, including title and treaty rights, as one that focuses on 
procedural justice for Indigenous peoples. Such jurisprudence purports to “reconcile pre-existing 
Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty”122 by subsuming the first within the 
second, insofar as it never throws into question the ultimate decision-making power of the 
Crown. Thus in Grassy Narrows, where the Supreme Court of Canada weighed in on the 
meaning of the “take-up clause” in Treaty 3, the focus remained on whether the provincial or 
federal Crown had the legal authority to take up land, rather than on the extent to which the 
taking-up required anything beyond mere “consultation and accommodation” on the part of the 
Indigenous treaty beneficiaries – especially in light of the fact that the latter were never privy to 
                                                 
119 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “The James Bay Treaty – Treaty No. 9 (Made in 1905 and 1906) and Adhesions 
Made in 1929 and 1930” (2013), online: Government of Canada <https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028863/1100100028864>.  
120 Ibid. Our emphasis in each of the treaty quotations. 
121 Ibid. Our emphasis.  
122 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511, 2004 SCC 73, at para 20 [Haida Nation]. 
26 
 
deals made between the provincial and the federal governments to alter the clear terms of their 
treaty.123 Likewise, the broader “duty to consult” jurisprudence always protects the final say of 
the Crown. Even on the end of the spectrum of consultation rights where title or treaty rights 
provide the most protection to Indigenous communities’ jurisdiction, the protection afforded to 
the Indigenous right to consent/refuse construction, extraction, or other “development” projects 
on their territories is subject to the Crown’s “justifiable infringement.”124  
 
Yet, the text of historic treaties such as Treaty 9 also points to an engagement between the 
Crown with Indigenous signatories that supports a very different interpretation of the “common 
intention that best reconciles the interests of both parties at the time the treaty was signed”.125 As 
mentioned above, the first part of the take-up clause signals the promise made to the signatory 
First Nations that they would be able to continue to use their lands as they always had. Most 
importantly, what is being signed is construed by the Crown itself as a treaty: not a simple 
transaction, but the beginning of a formal, longstanding relationship between self-governing 
peoples, affecting their respective jurisdiction and authority to govern, and aimed at preserving 
peace between peoples who might otherwise come to war.  
 
Thus, the Indigenous “chiefs and headmen” are signing the treaty “on behalf of” their people – or 
“bands”, as the text refers to them. The treaty semi-explicitly recognizes the Indigenous nations 
entering into treaty not only as the possessors of the territory they are purportedly “ceding”, but 
as self-governing entities, since they are deemed capable of “authorizing” representatives for the 
purposes of negotiating and posing conclusive legal and political actions in their name. And 
although the written text of Treaty 9 includes the above-mentioned clause to the effect that First 
Nation signatories will henceforth be “subjected to” and respect “the law” of the Crown, 
nowhere does it mention that Indigenous treaty signatories would thus be relinquishing the 
jurisdiction they had always exercised over themselves and their lands.  
 
Indeed, from the representations made to them by the Crown treaty commissioners, the Cree, 
Ojibway and Algonquin nations who entered into Treaty 9 understood the treaty as being “about 
friendship, not about cession.”126 They believed, as the Matawa Chiefs Council puts it, that they 
would receive “protection and assistance from a benevolent king” 127 in exchange for “a land 
sharing and resource sharing arrangement”128, consistent with John Long’s research findings that 
the people of Treaty 9 “expected the treaty to be a confirmation of the fur trade model of co-
existence, a modest sharing of the land and its benefits.”129 Not only did they sign the treaty 
understanding that it would protect their relationship to the land, and the rights and 
responsibilities they exercised according to their own laws by harvesting on it, as documented by 
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the first part of the “take-up clause” in the written treaty text, but as Hookimaw-Witt reports, the 
second part of that clause was neither disclosed nor explained by the Crown representatives.130  
 
Research shows that the treaty commissioners arrived at the various sites of Treaty 9 signature 
across northern Ontario with the text already completed – a text largely based on the model of 
the 1850 Robinson treaties, like the rest of the treaties signed between 1871 and 1921 – and 
without the authority “to change any of the wording in the document, even if their oral 
explanations of the treaty were not actually supported by its text.”131 
 
Writing with John Cutfeet, Rachel Ariss sums up the Indigenous signatories’ understanding of 
the friendship they were formalizing with the Crown – a solemn occasion, given the Crown 
representatives’ reference to the eternal nature of their mutual commitments, meant to last “as 
long as the sun shines, the rivers flow, and the grass grows”132  – as follows:    
 
“Community representatives who signed Treaty Nine understood that this document 
meant that they were willing to allow the Crown to share their traditional lands, in 
exchange for protection from the incursions of white loggers, miners and trappers, and 
certain benefits, such as treaty payments and specific reserves where newcomers would 
not be able to interfere with them. The ‘sharing’ envisaged was not continuous 
incursions, nor a ceding of their jurisdiction, but a mutually beneficial way of living 
together. They saw the treaty as providing official recognition of their right to continue 
their way of life without interference, and providing guidance for peaceful relations 
between themselves and the newcomers.”133 
 
It is worth noting that this understanding by the Treaty 9 Cree, Ojibway and Algonquin of the 
terms of their relationship with the Crown is akin to that of the Denésoliné signatories of Treaties 
8 and 11 – the text of which is very similar to that of Treaty 9.134 In the Paulette case, heard in 
1973, the Treaty 11 First Nations were able to produce witnesses to the representations made by 
the Crown prior to the signature of this treaty (given that the Paulette hearing took place only 
about fifty years after the signature of Treaty 11, this was a possibility that most other 
                                                 
130 Jacqueline Hookimaw-Witt (1998) quotes the elder Moses Fidler: “[W]hen the representatives came to our village in Big 
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Graves of Our Ancestors”]. 
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“The Numbered Treaties (1871-1921)” (2013), Government of Canada, online: <https://www.rcaanc-
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Indigenous treaty signatories did not have, or would not have for much longer). Those witnesses’ 
testimony, to the effect that the Denésoliné did not intend nor understand that the treaty would 
extinguish their Aboriginal rights to the land, was accepted by the judge – a finding which was 
not overturned on appeal135 and which directly resulted in negotiations toward modern treaties in 
the Northwest Territories for Treaty 11 signatories.136  
 
In short, what remains implicit in the written texts of treaties such as Treaty 9, paving the way to 
a profoundly misleading interpretation of historic treaties as providing the Crown with the 
exclusive jurisdiction over the territories they cover, is that the land was meant to be shared. 
Those treaty texts therefore leave an enormous gap regarding the delineation of their signatories’ 
respective and overlapping jurisdictions and of the decision-making processes by which the 
sharing should proceed.137 Thus, if the “common intention” of historic treaties “that best 
reconciles the interests of the parties at the time they were signed”138 is that of sharing the land, 
the way to properly fill the gap is by mandating negotiations to delineate how this sharing will 
occur – as the Ontario Superior Court has recently done when interpreting the particular 
language and circumstances of the Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior treaties.139  
 
How should we approach this work of filling in the gaps of historic treaty texts so as to provide 
relevant contemporary expression to the integration of jurisdictions that historic Crown promises 
and Indigenous understandings of treaties require? Such integration of jurisdictions is what the 
modern treaty process, which began in 1975 and continues to this day in the parts of Canada 
where treaties were not previously concluded, is all about. As advocates and scholars have 
pointed out, modern treaty negotiations, final agreements and jurisprudence have generated 
principles that could be applied to the task of filling in the gaps of historic treaty texts.140 Doing 
so would also go some distance towards correcting a related disparity: the deeply unjust 
discrepancy between historic and modern treaty rights and obligations141 – and bring more 
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140 See Julie Jai, “Bargains made in Bad Times: How Principles from Modern Treaties Can Reinvigorate Historic Treaties” in The 
Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties, eds John Borrows and Michael Coyle, (University of 
Toronto Press: 2017) at 105 [Jai, “Bargains made in Bad Times”].   
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coherence and unity to the regime of Indigenous rights that informs, at the most fundamental 
level, the Canadian Constitution.  
 
In a recent article, Julie Jai, a scholar and lawyer who negotiated the Teslin Tlingit 
Administration of Justice Agreement on behalf of the Yukon government, synthesizes the 
modern treaty principles applicable to the reinvigoration of historic treaties as follows. First, 
treaties provide a framework for an ongoing relationship of mutual respect and mutual 
benefit.142 They are not static, one-time transactions, but living arrangements that must lay out 
mechanisms for “fostering ongoing relationships of cooperation and communication”143 and be 
revisited when stalemates occur, or in light of new and unforeseen circumstances. The second 
principle is that of fair dealing, in particular, that the Crown should behave honourably and not 
disadvantage a First Nation because of when they signed their treaty.144 Jai highlights how this 
principle has been applied in negotiations with different First Nations in the Yukon to ensure that 
those with less leverage would not be unfairly treated: if one of them obtained a better deal, those 
“who had already signed off on their agreements can open up their agreements and get the 
benefit of this more favourable position.”145 Finally, the third principle states that treaties should 
include a fair process for resolving disputes.146 This principle has been used in modern treaties to 
define how the mediators and arbitrators of treaty disputes would be selected, to ensure they 
would have knowledge of applicable Indigenous laws as well as the common law, and to 
describe all other aspects of the dispute-resolution process.147  
 
In what follows, we draw on our research with KI – and in particular, on the work they have 
done since Platinex to articulate aspects of their laws in order to assert jurisdiction over their 
homelands – and on our interactions with leaders and members of other Treaty 9 First Nations, to 
lay out what filling in the gaps of Treaty 9 might consist in, if approached systematically under 
each of the modern treaty principles laid out above. 
 
a. The treaty must be understood as a framework for an ongoing relation of mutual respect and 
mutual benefit  
As Julie Jai states, modern treaties typically contain clauses to recognize that the treaty is not just 
a fixed set of obligations that can be discharged in a transactional fashion, once and for all.  But 
the notion that the parties intended to establish an ongoing relation of mutual respect and benefit 
is not new. It is supported by the research into Indigenous understandings of the treaties adhered 
to between 1850 and 1930. As Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark has demonstrated, in Anishinaabe 
understandings, the treaties were meant to protect the people’s rights to the land and to “provide 
a base for a lasting relationship with the Crown”.148  “Treaties were clearly not static agreements 
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from an Anishinaabe perspective but were contingent on each nation meeting the obligations 
they carried”.149 Establishing institutions of ‘maintenance’, then, is crucial.150 
 
One tool that is employed in modern treaties to accomplish this goal of ongoing relationships of 
mutual respect and benefit is “co-management”. Co-management arrangements emerged over the 
past two decades, mostly in the modern treaty context, as new decision-making institutions 
comprised of representatives from Indigenous and settler governments were created to exercise 
joint authority over certain resource management decisions.151  The precise structure of co-
management varies “with the nature of the resource, the political context, the expertise of 
participants, the authority exercised, and the range of management decisions involved”.152 At one 
end of the spectrum, we might place processes for ‘joint decision-making’ as envisioned in the 
Far North Act, where final authority remains with the Crown, based on the input and mapping 
done by Indigenous communities.  At the other end of the spectrum, we might think of a scheme 
in which communities exercise their inherent jurisdiction to make resource management, 
permitting and approval decisions themselves, based on the ‘grounded authority’ that comes 
from knowing the land, and simply report those decisions to the state.153 Between these 
extremes, there is obviously quite a lot of space for different structures to emerge; there would 
also be conceptual possibilities for exercising respective jurisdictions over different resources or 
parts of the territory, or various overlapping areas of distinct authority etc.154  The latter idea is in 
line with the emerging notion of “collaborative consent”, where a process is mutually agreed 
upon and where it establishes the conditions for parties to act as “co-equals”.155  Scholars 
developing this concept emphasize that “collaborative consent does not require any government 
involved to surrender authority. Nor does it mean that all governments are involved in all 
decisions at all times”.156  
 
We should not be taken as arguing that co-management in Ontario’s far north would be 
undeniably positive for the Treaty 9 nations. The literature shows that the process of developing 
co-management regimes is often an exercise through which the state expands its authority, 
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legitimacy and capacity to govern where it presently does not possess these attributes.157 
Collaborative processes can also sometimes “enhance the role of Indigenous leaders and 
negotiators but not necessarily that of community members”.158   Still, the negotiation of co-
management regimes can be a process through which settler institutions are forced to explicitly 
recognize the authority and legitimacy of Indigenous governance systems.159 Much depends on 
the actual structure of the arrangements achieved, and the degree to which the Indigenous 
authorities exercise meaningful control.  Our position is simply that the mechanism presents an 
opening to destabilize the assumed exclusivity of state sovereignty and to facilitate expressions 
and applications of alternative legal orders, such as Kanawayandan D’aaki.160 
 
The spirit of a meaningful ongoing treaty relationship, as understood by some of the Treaty 9 
communities, has actually been the object of a recent, concrete formulation. Indeed, in the 
context of the Ring of Fire proposals, the nine First Nations of the Matawa Council negotiated a 
Regional Framework Agreement161 with the provincial Crown in 2014, listing the following 
“Principles”: 
 
Government-to-Government: Recognition of the government-to-government relationship 
among the Parties, with the willingness and commitment to strengthen that relationship, 
including through respect for and good faith intention to reconcile differences between 
the Parties”;  
 
Positive and Long-Term Relationship: Willingness and commitment to forge a positive 
and long-term relationship based on the Principles herein, recognizing the past and 
seeking to build a more positive future; 
 
Mutual Respect: Willingness and commitment to hear each other and to act honourably 
and in good faith toward each other, including through meaningful appreciation of the 
Parties’ perspectives, constraints, values and culture; and 
 
Mutual Understanding: Willingness and commitment to understand each other's cultures, 
responsibilities and limitations; among others.162 
 
These principles present contemporary evidence not only that Treaty 9 nations continue to assert 
the fact that a treaty relationship involves an ongoing relationship of mutual respect and mutual 
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benefit – but also that Ontario, at least under some governments, is ready to acknowledge this 
and to give shape to such a relationship. 
 
The Regional Framework Agreement also indicates that the Parties commit to the “equitable 
sharing of the economic benefits” that flow from the territories.163 Ensuring socio-economic 
well-being is crucial to maintaining ecological integrity for a region like the far north. Measures 
for ensuring socio-economic well-being should be structural and long-term.164 There are multiple 
mechanisms through which Indigenous communities may receive economic benefits from 
resource extraction on their ancestral homelands – the most common being resource revenue 
sharing, and impact-benefit agreements.165  
 
Resource revenue sharing (RRS) typically occurs as governments sign agreements with specific 
First Nations, sometimes organized into Tribal Councils, to ‘share’ a portion of the mining tax 
revenues or timber stumpage fees that the government collects from companies operating 
there.166  Some First Nations in Ontario’s far north, in the Mushkegowuk, Wabun, and Grand 
Council #3 Tribal Councils, recently negotiated resource revenue sharing deals with Ontario.167 
The government’s stated intention was better relations and reconciliation.168 While these 
agreements are important and could theoretically generate some badly needed revenue for 
community priorities169, the fundamental problem with them is that Ontario still exercises the 
unilateral authority to permit the development that will give rise to the revenues. If Ontario 
recognized Indigenous governing authority and the communities exercised jurisdiction to 
approve or reject industry permits, then RRS – with the proportions to be ‘shared’ negotiated in 
this renewed treaty context, and the tax rate increased to ensure that appropriate revenues could 
be generated – could be a viable long-term mechanism for ensuring mutual benefit from the 
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absent. 
168 https://news.ontario.ca/mndmf/en/2018/05/ontario-partners-with-first-nations-to-share-forestry-and-mining-revenues.html. 
169 As it currently stands, however, this is a regime based on what Veltmeyer and Bowles call a mere ‘coincidence of economic 
interest’ – with “extraordinary profits for the companies” paired with relatively meagre additional revenues for Bands, based on 
the low tax rates imposed by the state authorities, see Veltmeyer & Bowles, “Extractivist Resistance”, supra note 19 at 63. Under 
settler law on the constitutional division of powers, provincial governments have the power to impose mining taxes and royalties. 
In Ontario, as an example, mining tax is imposed on profits from the extraction of minerals raised and sold by operators of 
Ontario mines. The tax rate on taxable profit subject to mining tax is 10 per cent for non-remote mines, and 5 per cent for remote 
mines. The tax is only applied to an operator's annual profit in excess of $500,000. Further, a mining tax exemption applies on up 
to $10 million of profit for each new or expanded mine. The exempt period for a non-remote mine is three years, and the exempt 
period for a remote mine is 10 years (Mining Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER M.15). Thus, there are several statutory 
limitations on the amount of revenue that can be generated through a resource revenue system; an Indigenous governing authority 
may not choose to offer those same ‘incentives’ to miners.  
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territory, as long as the development was consistent with the affected communities’ visions for 
their homelands.170   
 
Impact-benefit agreements (IBAs) are another mechanism used in modern treaties for ensuring 
that Indigenous communities benefit economically from the wealth of the territories. We argue, 
however, that IBAs suffer the same fundamental flaw under current conditions.171 In this case, 
the contracts are between the First Nations and the resource companies themselves, and they 
typically involve the company providing annual per-capita payments, certain employment or 
training commitments, environmental monitoring and/or some lump-sum funding towards 
community priorities such as a recreation center.172 Increasingly, they include equity stakes in 
the underlying business as well. In exchange, the community is typically required to provide 
their ‘support’ for the project.173  Under modern treaties, a common way of achieving relations of 
mutual benefit is through the requirement that any industry authorized to extract resources from 
the territory conclude IBAs with affected communities. 
 
“Getting to No”174 
 
While some commentators argue that IBAs are superior to RRS and other state-dependent 
mechanisms, because they seem to offer some acknowledgement of Indigenous territorial rights 
and allow communities to assert their “political autonomy from the settler-state” through 
‘bilateral’ negotiations with companies, there are several worries in relation to how a 
requirement for “agreements” to be concluded is or could be operating in the broader settler 
colonial context.175 Strictly considering the current state of doctrine in settler law today, 
notwithstanding the adoption of UNDRIP, the idea of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) – 
and conversely, the possibility that ‘no’ could mean ‘no’ – is not yet a feature of Canadian 
jurisprudence.176 Instead, we have the duty to consult and accommodate under s.35 of the 
                                                 
170 Communities would also, in this context, have a hand in the crafting of rules that would apply to industry activity on the land; 
that is, it would no longer be the case that Ontario would be the sole legislative authority, thus the set of rules governing 
applicable tax rates, tax holidays and exemptions would not be based on assumptions of underlying Crown ownership of all 
resources.   
171 St-Laurent & Le Billon, “Staking Claims and Shaking Hands”, supra note 12.   
172 Ginger Gibson & Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh “IBA Community Toolkit: Negotiation and Implementation of Impact and Benefit 
Agreements” (2010) Commissioned by the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, Ottawa; Irene Sosa & Karyn Keenan Impact 
benefit agreements between aboriginal communities and mining companies: their use in Canada (Toronto: Canadian 
Environmental Law Association, 2001); Cameron & Levitan, “Impact and Benefit Agreements”, supra note 11; Caine & 
Krogman “Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full”, supra note 11; David Szablowski, “Operationalizing Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent in the Extractive Industry Sector? Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of Justice” (2010) 30:1 Revue 
Canadienne d’études du développement 111 [Szablowski “Operationalizing FPIC”]. While the contracts are often seen as ‘private 
law’, between two private, contracting parties, it is important to remember both that they are actually negotiated by Indigenous 
governments, implying a public character, and that that they are backed by the state enforcement of settler contract law and its 
remedies. 
173 Caine & Krogman “Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full”, supra note 11. 
174 Reference to Fisher and Ury’s famous negotiation text: Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving, (1981). 
175  Prno et al., “Impact and Benefit Agreements: Are they working?”(2010) CIM Conference, Vancouver at 1. Also Gabrielle 
Slowey has argued that Indigenous communities are exercising jurisdictional autonomy as self-determining nations when they 
bypass the state and negotiate directly with industry towards goals of economic self-reliance. 
176 Imai, “Consult, Consent & Veto”, supra note 13. As Papillon and Rodon state, “to this day, controversy over the meaning of 
the right to FPIC continues to be one of the major roadblocks to the full implementation of UNDRIP in Canada”, Papillon & 
Rodon, “Environmental Assessment Processes and FPIC”, supra note 12 at 2. At the time of writing, Canada is poised to become 
the first country to fully incorporate UNDRIP in to national law, as Bill C-262, a private member’s bill is debated in the Senate.  
In section 4, it states: “The Government of Canada, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples in Canada, must take 
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Constitution – a spectrum of consultation and accommodation rights developed by the settler 
courts to manage areas on which Aboriginal and Treaty rights have been claimed or 
recognized.177 But as mentioned earlier, even on the end of that spectrum where title or treaty 
rights provide the most protection to Indigenous communities’ jurisdiction, the protection 
afforded to the Indigenous right to consent/refuse construction, extraction, or settlement projects 
remains subject to the Crown’s “justifiable infringement.”178 
 
To bring us back to the Treaty 9 context, a regulation made under the Mining Act in 2012 now 
requires Ontario to notify First Nations that may be affected by an application for an exploration 
permit, so that the community may identify any concerns. The proponent is then required to 
consult with the community and Ontario may require the proponent to file a report detailing the 
consultation process, “including with regard to any arrangement reached with an Aboriginal 
community or the efforts made to reach such an arrangement, before deciding whether to issue 
an exploration permit”.179  One remote Ring of Fire community, Eabametoong First Nation, 
embroiled in a dispute with a junior mining company learned recently in a decision on a judicial 
review application that, in the Ontario Divisional Court’s view, the duty to consult does not give 
the community the right to ‘unilaterally’ insist that an agreement be in place before the permit 
can be granted – even where the community was trying to leverage the negotiations towards an 
MOU in order to achieve minimum accommodations from the company.180 One commitment 
that Eabametoong First Nation was trying to extract from the company was that they would clean 
up and remediate their previous exploration camp prior to being granted approval for another 
one.181  
 
This example makes very clear that the problem with the current regime is not that the 
proponents are not required to put in place IBAs before they are given approval to proceed with 
extractive projects. The fundamental problem is that the Indigenous communities whose lands 
are affected are not recognized as holding the jurisdiction to decide whether or not permits 
should be granted.182 Negotiations towards IBAs are always “premised on the assumption that 
the project will be approved”.183  It is a matter of deciding on the “compensation package [that 
                                                 
all measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.”. 
177 Haida Nation, supra note 123; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69; Clyde 
River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., 2017 SCC 40; Tsleil-Waututh, supra note 13. 
178 See Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 125 and Campbell, supra note 125 regarding the capacity to infringe even painstakingly 
negotiated modern treaty rights. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075; Prophet River First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 
2017 FCA 15.  
179 Exploration Plans and Exploration Permits, O. Reg. 308/12, s 14. 
180 Eabametoong, supra note 16. The junior mining company, for its part, was trying to leverage the MOU initially as a way of 
marketing their assets to investors. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Only a right of consultation, see Penelope C. Simons and Lynda Margaret Collins “Participatory Rights in the Ontario Mining 
Sector: An International Human Rights Perspective” (2010) 6:2 McGill Intl J of Sust Dev L & Pol’y. As Imai says “The problem 
with the consult standard is that the community feels powerless because they are powerless. It is difficult for people to trust a 
process of discussion when they know that no matter what happens, the final decision is not in their hands”, see Imai, “Consult, 
Consent & Veto”, supra note 13 at 385-386. Even if they were not structurally disadvantaged in this way, communities would 
also be in a position of inferiority in terms of negotiation power based on access to lawyers and the Crown’s role as a repeat 
player, see Arielle Dylan et al., “Saying No to Resource Development is Not an Option” (2013) 47:1 J of Cndn Studies 59; 
Szablowski, “Operationalizing FPIC”, supra note 172. See also Drake, “Trials and Tribulations”, supra note 43, who 
demonstrates that this problem, which persists after the recent round of alterations to the Mining Act and its regulations, makes 
the Ontario mining regime unconstitutional. 
183 Papillon & Rodon, “Environmental Assessment Processes and FPIC”, supra note 12 at 153. 
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will be provide] in exchange for consent”.184  Until communities actually have the power to say 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ to extractive activities on their ancestral homelands, it is impossible to conclude 
that an IBA can constitute evidence of meaningful ‘consent’ to a project.185 There is a structural 
power imbalance in place, and it “results in part from the ability of companies to decide with 
which communities they will negotiate, to end negotiations, and more generally to get projects 
approved and proceed without IBAs”.186  Because communities are not in a position to envision 
their own projects for the territory, IBAs are often perceived as the “best (and often last) option 
for influencing the flow of resources back to the community”, meaning that other parties’ 
development projects become virtually “inevitable”.187 Negotiations towards IBAs never 
question “the nature and necessity of the project itself, [only] how it can be managed in a way 
that limits and mitigates its risks and negative impacts while enabling high economic returns”.188 
The contractual focus on the ‘mitigation’ of environmental effects thus presumes the approval of 
the development from the outset of the relationship between the parties, even now with “pre-
exploration agreements”.189 
 
The following quote by John Borrows is written in the context of evolving s.35 jurisprudence, 
but it applies equally to this question of governing through contract: 
 
To the extent First Nations succeed in rounding out the edges of this encroachment, their 
interests will likely be forced to align with the provinces’ interests. This is called 
reconciliation. Such alignment might produce some marginal economic health for First 
Nations. However, the beads and trinkets won through reconciliation may come at the 
expense of their own preferred ways of living.190 
 
There is also a notion of environmental sustainability built into many of the ‘preferred ways of 
living’ as they are articulated by the Treaty 9 communities. “Our definition [of what should 
happen in the Ring of Fire],” former-NAN Grand Chief Beardy explains, “is that we’re saving 
something today for future consideration, leaving the option for future generations to decide 
what they need for their survival”.191 Unfortunately, as the literature shows, IBAs have thus far 
not been reliable in terms of generating “future benefit streams” nor for enacting alternative 
                                                 
184 Papillon & Rodon, “Environmental Assessment Processes and FPIC”, supra note 12 at 153. 
185 This engages, of course, the highly contested notion of whether Indigenous peoples, under UNDRIP, possess a right of “veto” 
over proposed development projects. Canada’s representative to the United Nations’ General Assembly in 2012 explained that 
Canada’s opposition to UNDRIP stemmed in part from concerns over the “free, prior and informed consent standard when used 
as a veto”. UN General Assembly, 2007, 107th plenary meeting, 13 September 2007, A1611PV.107 at 12. Martin Papillon and 
Thierry Rodon (2017) contributed a very useful analysis attempting to move debate beyond the question of whether FPIC 
constitutes a veto, arguing for a ‘relational model of FPIC” that incorporates the recognition of indigenous peoples as “full and 
equal governing partners in the decision-making process affecting their traditional lands” (3). Martin Papillon & Thierry Rodon, 
“Indigenous Consent and Natural resource Extraction: Foundations for a Made-in-Canada Approach” (2017) IRPP Insight, no.16, 
online: < https://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/insight-no16.pdf>. 
186 St-Laurent & Le Billion, “Staking Claims and Shaking Hands”, supra note 12 at 8. 
187 Caine & Krogman, “Powerful or just Plain Power-Full”, supra note 11 at 85. 
188 St-Laurent & Le Billion, “Staking Claims and Shaking Hands”, supra note 12 at 9. 
189  James, Anaya “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples. Addendum. The situation of indigenous 
peoples in Canada” (2014) A/HRC/27/52/Add.2.  
190 John Borrows & Michael Coyle (eds), The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties 
(University of Toronto Press: 2017) at 33 [Borrows & Coyle, “The Right Relationship”]. 
191 Quoted in Gorrie, “The Ring of Fire”, supra note 28.  
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visions of sustainable economic development.192 This derives at least in part from the fact that in 
both of these forms of benefit sharing, RRS and IBAs, Indigenous communities become more 
dependent on revenues generated through extractivism in order to meet their communities’ basic 
fiscal needs.193 As mentioned, this mode of accumulation is non-reciprocal and oriented to the 
short-term, creating a situation where communities, quite rationally, fear that once the mine’s life 
is finished, they will be left with no trace of the promised wealth and prosperity, but with the 
lasting legacy of a comprised homeland. 
  
As Veltmeyer and Bowles have demonstrated, ‘new’ forms of ‘progressive extractivism’ that 
incorporate benefit sharing with Indigenous communities, are often still dependent on the 
“destruction of both the environment and livelihoods, and [the] erosion of the territorial rights 
and sovereignty” of affected Indigenous communities.194 Further, Rauna Kuokkanen has recently 
put forward the tentative observation, based on comparative work on Indigenous governance of 
extraction in the Arctic regions, that negotiated forms of self-governance often result in an 
increased openness to extractive activities.195 As Indigenous authorities gain jurisdiction, she 
argues, they tend towards standard forms of economic development, forcing re-definition of 
relations with land into terms of revenues, assets and individual gain.  
 
b. The Crown has duty of fair dealing in relation to Indigenous peoples 
The Crown’s obligation of fair dealing in relation to Indigenous peoples is a foundational 
principle of Canadian law. As the Supreme Court has stated,  
 
“The obligation of honourable dealing was recognized from the outset by the Crown 
itself in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1), in 
which the British Crown pledged its honour to the protection of Aboriginal peoples from 
exploitation by non-Aboriginal peoples.”196 
 
The source of the obligation of honourable dealing was discussed by Chief Justice McLachlin, as 
she then was, in Haida, where she states that the duty to consult, which was the focus of the 
conflict before the Supreme Court in that case, 
 
“is part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins with the assertion of 
sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution. […] This process of 
reconciliation flows from the Crown’s duty of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal 
peoples, which arises in turn from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an 
Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the 
                                                 
192 Caine & Krogman, “Powerful or just Plain Power-Full”, supra note 11 at 78; Cameron & Levitan, “Impact and Benefit 
Agreements”, supra note 11. 
193 Thus, the deal-making dynamic actually undermines the practical ability of First Nations to determine desired land uses for 
themselves and leaves them to “self-determine” within the very narrow confines of extractive capitalism, see J. Dempsey et al., 
“Changing Land Tenure, Defining Subjects: Neo-liberalism and Property Regimes on Native Reserves” in Re-Thinking the Great 
White North: Race, Nature and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in Canada eds Andrew Baldwin et al. (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2011).  
194 Veltmeyer & Bowles, “Extractivist Resistance”, supra note 19 at 62. 
195 Rauna Kuokkanen, “At the intersection of Arctic indigenous governance and extractive industries: A survey of three cases” 
(2019) 6 The Extractive Industries and Society 15 at 19. 
196 Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para. 42. 
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control of that people. As stated in Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 2001 SCC 
33, at para. 9, “[w]ith this assertion [sovereignty] arose an obligation to treat Aboriginal 
peoples fairly and honourably, and to protect them from exploitation.” 197  
 
The constitutional obligation by the Crown of fair dealing with Indigenous peoples has important 
consequences for the reinvigoration of historic treaties’ interpretation. As Julie Jai puts it, why 
should “some First Nations, who signed treaties in bad times when they had neither bargaining 
power nor the benefit of lawyers […]” have less favorable treaty terms than those who signed 
later? She argues that the obligation of fair dealing must mean, in the treaty context, that “those 
who signed historic treaties should have the benefit of provisions negotiated more recently by 
First Nations who were able to understand the agreements they were signing and who had the 
benefit of more equal bargaining power”.198  
 
Given this theme of fair dealing and “more equal bargaining power”, we should clarify here our 
acknowledgement that modern treaty negotiations are far from a level playing field.  They 
present Indigenous communities with excruciating choices – including insidious tacit 
compromises regarding their very identities and legal sensibilities – causing modern treaty 
outcomes to be denounced by numerous thinkers and activists who have exposed the Orwellian 
dimension of the current vocabulary of “recognition” of Indigenous jurisdiction.199 Pushing for 
the requirement that the Crown’s actions, including its behaviour at the negotiating table, be held 
to scrutiny and to a standard of fair dealing is not naïve. KI’s actions over the past decade and 
more demonstrate the refusal of the community, among other Treaty 9 nations, to be cynical: 
they are prepared to take the stand most appropriate to the defense of their territory at any given 
time – whether that means putting bodies on the land directly antagonistic to the state, or 
engaging in negotiations to reach a lasting peace within it. In that context, it is worth taking 
seriously what the principle of fair dealing entails for the Crown. 
 
We argue that part of the duty of fair dealing is a requirement of transparency, or at least a 
restriction on using secrecy and confidentiality as tools to divide-and-conquer Indigenous 
communities. In relation to the far north, the open-endedness of the infrastructure decisions that 
need to be taken in order to make the proposed mines viable, such as the routes for access roads, 
contributes to a culture of secrecy and competition between neighboring nations. Because these 
communities are presently so isolated, the access roads may in fact have a bigger impact on their 
                                                 
197 Haida supra note X at para 32 (emphasis in the original). As noted by Professor Slattery, “This passage suggests that the duty 
of honourable dealing arose automatically upon the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over Indigenous nations. The Court does 
not invoke any specific Crown acts, such as the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Rather it portrays the duty as the inevitable by-
product of the process itself. No doubt the Court would acknowledge that the Proclamation bears witness to the existence of the 
duty, but evidently it rejects the view that the Proclamation (or any other Crown Act) is its source”: Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal 
Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433 at 445 (emphasis in the original). 
198 Jai at 141. 
199 Glen Coulthard, “Indigenous Peoples and the “Politics of Recognition” (2007) 6 Contemporary Political Theory 437. Johnny 
Mack, “Hoquotist: Reorienting through Storied Practice” in Jeremy H A Webber, Rebecca Johnson & Hester Lessard, eds, 
Storied Communities: Narratives of Contact and Arrival in Constituting Political Community (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011). 
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UBC Press, 2009). See also Vanessa Sloan Morgan, Heather Castleden and Huu-ay-aht First Nations, “This Is Going to Affect 
Our Lives”: Exploring Huu-ay-aht First Nations, the Government of Canada and British Columbia’s New Relationship Through 
the Implementation of the Maa-nulth Treaty” (2018) 33:3 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 309-334. 
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ways of life than the mining itself. The deal-making dynamic that pervades the Ring of Fire 
discussions raises several questions, from the perspective of implementing a duty of fair dealing.   
 
First, there are questions about whether members of affected communities are able to fully 
understand the proposed terms of a contractual agreement, and their consequences, before having 
to register a view. This is as true with respect to agreements with governments, as it is with 
companies. There is a sense that the strict confidentiality clauses, which typically prohibit the 
communication of the contents of the contracts to anyone outside the negotiating process, inhibit 
“cross-community comparisons… and holistic discussion of benefits and valuable experiences 
among communities…”.200  The recent RRS deals with Ontario may be an exception to this, as 
they have been made publicly available, and this approach is welcome for beginning a more open 
and transparent conversation about mutual benefit from the territories.201  Finally, a worry exists 
in relation to common non-compliance provisions in agreements that seek to prohibit 
“beneficiary populations” from opposing the project in any regulatory proceedings, or 
undertaking any actions that could impede or delay the development.202 These “gag orders” can 
purport to prevent community members from voicing concerns even if new impacts come to light 
only after the development gets off the ground.203 
 
Returning again to the promising process under the Regional Framework Agreement, it is not 
publicly known what progress was made over the four years of talks, since the outcomes have 
remained confidential. Communities have characterized them as “productive exploratory talks.” 
But it has been reported that late in the former Ontario premier’s tenure, “the whole process went 
into hibernation as the government shifted from trying to achieve consensus among the nine 
Matawa communities toward adopting a strategy of working only with the First Nations deemed 
“mining-ready.”204  Some of those communities have now concluded deals with the province to 
become road proponents, and with the companies to share in the revenues from any future 
mines.205 Other communities are left to fight the projects from the outside. 
 
A crucial example, therefore, of how the Crown is not living up to a duty of fair dealing in the far 
north, is in relation to the way environmental assessment processes are being organized for the 
                                                 
200 Caine & Krogman, “Powerful or just Plain Power-Full”, supra note 11 at 85. 
201 On the other hand, the fact that all three are identical gives rise to the suspicion that the deals were presented to the 
communities in a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ fashion.  
202 While both communities and industry at present support confidentiality, this may stem in part from the background set of 
incentives in place, ie the sense of inevitability of the ultimate approval.  In a situation of genuine co-management and joint 
dispute settlement, the secrecy that holds value for communities in a divide-and-conquer model may lose its power. While these 
‘gag orders’ are probably unenforceable against individual actors, we have also heard of variations on this clause in which the 
Indigenous government must indemnify the proponent for any loss suffered from unauthorized blockades or other actions. We 
have also heard of clauses in which the Indigenous government accepts a positive duty to defend the project against criticism in 
public fora. 
203 Kennett provides an example of an agreement where the community agreed not to “object to the issuance of any licenses, 
permits, authorizations or approvals to construct or operate the project.”, see Steven A. Kennett, “Issues and Options for a Policy 
on Impact and Benefit Agreements” (Calgary: Discussion paper prepared for the Mineral Resource Directorate, Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development by the Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 27 May 1999).   
204 Northern Ontario Business “Lack of consultation on Ring of Fire development frustrates First Nation communities” 
(November 12, 2018) BayToday.ca, online: <https://www.baytoday.ca/local-news/lack-of-consultation-on-ring-of-fire-
development-frustrates-first-nation-communities-1119352/> [Northern Ontario Business “Lack of Consultation”]. 
205 Government of Ontario, “Marten Falls community access road project” Ontario.ca, online: 
<https://www.ontario.ca/page/marten-falls-community-access-road-project> [Government of Ontario “Marten Falls”]; 
Government of Ontario, “Webequie supply road project” Ontario.ca, online: https://www.ontario.ca/page/webequie-supply-road-
project [Government of Ontario “Webequie”]. Insert Noront. 
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Ring of Fire developments in this context. Both the federal and provincial government have been 
repeatedly urged to apply a broad, regional and strategic lens to the assessment of the cumulative 
impacts on the lands, waters and people of the Matawa region, and to work in partnership with 
the communities to set up a structure for taking the coming infrastructure and extraction 
decisions.206 Instead, two discrete environmental assessments are underway for the construction 
of two short portions of road being put forward by specific ‘partnered’ and presumably ‘mining-
ready’ communities. These roads will presumably eventually be linked, after separate stand-
alone environmental assessments, to the mine site in the Ring of Fire.207 Commentators complain 
that:  
“the narrow focus of separate assessment processes… cannot address overall impacts to 
the region at large, and will do nothing to stave off the inevitable cumulative effects that 
will arise when the Ring of Fire is open for business. It is well known that mines have 
limited operational lives and a history of negative legacy effects in remote regions. 
Enabling access to new deposits and opening up First Nations’ traditional lands require a 
more thoughtful design and approach to sustainability than has so far been 
considered”.208 
 
A leader of one of the remote Ring of Fire communities, Chief Elizabeth Atlookan, calls it a 
“quick and dirty approach to opening up the whole north” and questions why, for such “high 
stakes” decisions, a more comprehensive review cannot be undertaken.209 In fact, “experience 
demonstrates that regional-scale assessments can provide greater scope for the identification, 
evaluation and pursuit of different futures”.210 A regional or strategic environmental assessment 
of the Ring of Fire developments, in fact, is the very least that is required: an Indigenous-led 
strategic planning process, rather than being organizing around mitigating predicted ‘negative 
environmental effects’, might be oriented towards fostering discussion and community 
consensus on developments or economies that could be pursued that would generate lasting 
benefits for the communities and have an overall positive impact on sustainability in the 
region.211  The Treaty 9 communities deserve to participate in the process of visioning that will 
shape their lands, waters and economies for decades to come. 
 
In our conception of a renewed Treaty relationship in Treaty 9 territory, the Crown’s duty of fair 
dealing would lead to transparent and open processes that do not pit one community against the 
other. These processes and institutions would generate insights and strategies for fostering 
reciprocity that can bring people into substantive, open and continuous dialogue about visions for 
the future, rather than being locked into closed, static and routinized processes that aim at 
achieving one-off ‘agreements’ instead of substantive outcomes. 
                                                 
206 As an example, the Matawa Nations developed a “Community Driven Regional Strategy” under which they aimed to 
negotiate an environmental assessment process with Ontario that would “include meaningful First Nation participation, 
consultation, decision making and would consider the accumulated impacts of more than one development.” Matawa First 
Nations, “Community Driven Regional Strategy” (2013), online: <http://www.matawa.on.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Regional-Strategy-Brochuresmallpdf.com_.pdf> at 2. 
207 Government of Ontario, “Marten Falls” and “Webequie”, supra note 202. The Marten Falls community access road proposal 
links the provincial highway system to the community along what is commonly understood to be the north-south route into the 
potential future mine site; the Webequie supply road proposal links the community’s airstrip to that site. 
208 Cheryl Chetkiewicz et al., “A sustainable plan for Ontario’s Ring of Fire” (July 17 2018) Policy Options, online: 
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c. There should be a mutually agreeable process for resolving disputes between the treaty 
beneficiaries 
We now turn to the question of dispute resolution. Michael Coyle demonstrates that both parties 
to a treaty typically seek to ensure effective recourse in the case of dispute.212  As Jai writes, the 
“critical issue is what processes will be engaged to resolve these disputes, and to what extent will 
they involve both treaty partners?”213 Parties to Treaty 9 would benefit from a fair, mutually 
agreeable process through which not only amendments to the Treaty can be made, but also 
disputes can be resolved by adjudicative bodies made up of members appointed by both 
Indigenous and settler governments. As Coyle and Borrows state “…when disagreements arise 
about whether a historical treaty allows unfettered exploitation of the resources found on treaty 
lands, the parties usually have nowhere to turn apart from costly and adversarial contention in the 
[settler] courts”.214 
 
Why would recourse lie only to Canadian courts? Given KI’s experience with the settler legal 
system, we agree with Gordon Christie, who notes that, with few exceptions, contemporary 
jurisprudence flowing from the settler courts “actually sanctions, affirms and strengthens [a] 
colonial conceptual framework”.215 Others note that Canadian judges appointed by settler 
governments have been, and will likely continue to be, “reluctant to admit claims that question 
the fundamental premises of their society, such as the validity of Crown assertions of 
sovereignty”.216   
 
In terms of resource extraction disputes in the far north, it is significant that the Mining & Lands 
Commission217 members are appointed solely by the provincial Crown; they are directed to apply 
only settler law.218  In just one example, a decision of the Mining & Lands Commissioner 
affecting a remote Ring of Fire community held in a very cursory analysis that the First Nation 
had surrendered their land rights in Treaty 9, that the only rights that remained were those 
protected by s.35, to consultation and accommodation, and that, since Section 2 of Public Lands 
Act clearly states that the Minister of Natural Resources has control over the disposition of public 
lands, the community was not even entitled to standing in the proceeding determining surface 
rights for a road through its traditional territory.219   
 
And so we return to one of the core questions posed at the outset of this paper: What happens 
when Indigenous governing authorities, applying Indigenous legal principles, issue a clear 
refusal to a given extractive project on their traditional territory, or more generally, to a proposed 
                                                 
212 Borrows & Coyle, “The Right Relationship”, supra note 190.  
213 Ibid, at 143. 
214 Ibid, Introduction at 4. Recall, that in the KI-Platinex dispute, the community complained to the court that it could ‘no longer 
afford your justice system’. 
215 Gordon Christie, “A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and Haida Nation” (2005) 23 Windsor 
YB of Access Just 17 at 21 [Christie, “A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence”]. 
216 Borrows & Coyle, “The Right Relationship”, supra note 190 at 8. 
217 In 2017, the Office of the Mining and Lands Commissioner moved from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry to 
join the Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario and became the Mining and Lands Tribunal (MLT). Its functions – determining 
claims and settling disputes under the Mining Act -- were not altered.  
218 2274659 Ontario Inc. v. Canada Chrome Corporation and Minister of Natural Resources and Neskataga First Nation, File 
No. MA005-12, online: <https://elto.gov.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/11-2.pdf>. 
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land use within it? When Indigenous and settler authorities disagree as to the interpretation and 
interaction of their respective laws, or the scope of their respective jurisdictions?  If meaningful 
co-management bodies, the first logical locus of authoritative reconciliation regarding 
Indigenous and settler views on the proper use and stewardship of the land, fail to do so, 
adjudicating the dispute cannot reasonably be expected to occur solely through settler law, as 
interpreted by one of the currently-constituted settler courts. In short, Treaty institutions cannot 
give voice solely to settler views, approaches, and instruments. Alternative processes and 
interpretive bodies, genuinely capable of taking into meaningful consideration both settler and 
Indigenous laws on a jurisdictionally specific basis, and thus of enjoying legitimacy in the eyes 
of both settler and Indigenous societies, are a necessary part of turning the current competition 
between State and Indigenous legal orders into a meaningful cooperation.    
 
In respect of authorizing and monitoring resource extraction activities in Indigenous homelands – 
including, of course, enforcing any refusal of such activities – dispute resolution systems must be 
designed with jointly or separately appointed arbiters, trained in the respective instruments (and 
more deeply, sensibilities220) of the specific legal orders that apply in any given part of the 
country.221  This is what having “one law” actually means in Canada: a fruitful, workable, 
ongoing discussion and cooperation between distinct legal orders. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The fallout from the KI-Platinex dispute did not just point to problems with the free-entry system 
and the Mining Act, such that settler courts could require amendment to insert ‘consultation’ and 
render the scheme barely constitutional under settler law.222  The dispute actually exposed deep 
problems with the relationship between the Treaty parties.  In this piece we have made use of the 
community’s invitation to reflect on the significance of their legal drafting, to think 
systematically about how to fill the gaps that remain in the context of historical Treaty No.9.   
 
Taking the treaty seriously means accepting that KI’s vision for desirable land uses on the 
territory is at least as legitimate as Ontario’s, reflecting local priorities and local knowledge.  In 
addition to recognizing Indigenous governing authority, however, it also means grappling with 
KI’s challenge to Ontario’s claim to ownership of all of the resource wealth that flows from the 
territory. Taking the treaty seriously in fact brings into being a radically different legal order. In 
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this new legal order, the parties would each exercise authority to grant or refuse approvals for 
new exploration permits in areas of respective and joint jurisdiction; arrangements for mutual 
benefits from the wealth of the territories would emerge from a more even playing field in which 
IBAs, and revenue sharing arrangements would be newly negotiated in a transparent process not 
premised on an assumption of underlying Crown title; dispute settlement would be jointly 
designed and implemented by adjudicators conversant in both legal orders. 
 
As one Chief of a remote Treaty 9 community stated in a press release aimed at prompting 
Ontario to return to the bargaining table in respect of the Ring of Fire infrastructure planning, the 
community wishes to “arrive at a negotiated agreement with Ontario on the scale, pace and forms 
of development that are helpful to our people as we work towards a sustainable future”.223  The 
communities want to exercise their governing authority over the land. Their decisions are not 
pre-determined, but contingent, and they will be taken in accordance with their own protocols in 
Oji-Cree and Anishinaabe law. This was echoed in KI: 
 
“[Other communities have been forced to allow industry] to be put into their community, 
to destroy their forests, rivers and lake, lands and fish…. I understand that, but KI still 
has a choice. We still have our environment, land, medicines, and all these things are 
related. Why would we want to risk destroying all the things we have right now just to 
get the minerals in the ground and be left with nothing in the long term? Yes, there may 
come a time in future when the people of KI might need to access those minerals in the 
ground to sustain themselves for future generations, but that’s not for us to decide in this 
generation.”224 
Our analysis here has canvassed what we know about the principles and mechanisms embedded 
in modern treaties, and explored how those could be imported into the historic treaty re-
interpretation process.  We have sought to bring our grounded knowledge of the current resource 
extraction dynamics in Treaty 9 to fill in the gaps and suggest concrete reforms, or renewed 
approaches.  We have looked carefully at statements, practices and documents that have been 
emanating from Treaty 9 communities in order to bring forward their understandings and visions. 
The rationale for disclosing and disseminating the motivations for the KI work of legal drafting 
is to extract from that work the understandings that can facilitate the filling in of the treaty. We 
argue that in places like KI, and in fact throughout Treaty 9 territory, the deep knowledge and 
respect for the land, and the authority to govern it, should go together.225 
  
The approach we are calling for in Ontario’s far north would involve a continuous commitment 
to negotiations towards a complex set of government-to-government agreements that chip away 
at the colonial legal order. We are not calling for improvements to settler law; not asking the 
provincial government to amend its statutes to better recognize Indigenous rights. The 
arrangements to operationalize multiple, overlapping, shared and respective jurisdictions go 
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beyond making amendments to settler regimes and colonial management tools.226  They are 
about “carving out political space” for Indigenous communities to exercise their governing 
authority.227 They will entail new structures and institutions for joint decision-making, and the 
incorporation of areas, both physical and conceptual, or exclusive Indigenous jurisdiction.  
 
The communities throughout Ontario’s far north entered into Treaty 9 as sovereign nations. The 
Treaty was a solemn promise. The imbalance created by the Crown’s failure to live up to the 
terms of the promise must be remedied through the establishment of a new relationship, 
solidified through new institutions. The people in these communities take with the utmost 
seriousness their inherent right and responsibility to govern those lands and waters.  While the 
exercise of these rights and duties does not require written laws, because they are rooted in 
specific relations and practices that connect the people to the land – in KI, the people have made 
an attempt to translate those laws into written form so as to make them legible to the settler legal 
system. Returning to the question of ‘what happens when Indigenous law says ‘no’ and settler 
law says ‘yes’ to a resource project, our answer is that a renewed treaty relationship, guided by 
principles and mechanisms from modern treaty making, would provide principled answers, 
distinct to each applicable Indigenous legal order. The crucial question to ask in Ontario’s far 
north is: What does treaty law say?228  
 
As many scholars of Indigenous law have observed, despite Canada’s assertion of a uniform and 
exclusive jurisdictional authority over all lands and resources according to a settler constitutional 
order, a vast multiplicity of Indigenous governance systems continue to operate today.  Each is 
unique to the territory, and the specific legal and political tradition, it applies to.229  To fail to 
challenge the analytical paradigm that continually positions the settler legal order as a unitary 
and central authority, in ‘conflict’ with Indigenous law, is in fact to perpetuate the settler colonial 
order. De-centering settler law, in part by reconceiving and reinvigorating historic Treaty law 
along the lines advocated here, participates in (and we hope furthers) the vast undertaking of 
decolonizing Canadian law to achieve more just relationships.230  
 
The Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug have a continuing right to govern and to share in the wealth 
generated on their territory. As the Anishinaabek scholar Leanne Betamosatake Simpson argues: 
 
“The Canadian state has always been primarily interested in acquiring the “legal” rights 
to our land for settlement and for the extraction of natural resources. The removal and 
erasure of [our] bodies from the land make it easier for the state to acquire and maintain 
sovereignty over land because this not only removes physical resistance to dispossession, 
it also erases the political orders and relationships housed within Indigenous bodies that 
attach our bodies to the land”.231 
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The people of KI remain willing to put their bodies on the land, and their legal and political 
orders into the public domain. As mentioned, they do so in strategic engagement with their 
Treaty partners and in the hopes of bringing into being a renewed Treaty relationship. These are 
acts of “generative refusal” that point the way forward: one law, treaty law.232 
 
 
                                                 
232 Ibid, at 178. 
